Ethics Needed in the US Counterintelligence Community Capstone Project

Open, View, and/or
Download this Document

Total Length: 18748 words ( 62 double-spaced pages)

Total Sources: 0

Page 1 of 62

A PHP Error was encountered

Severity: Warning

Message: strpos(): Offset not contained in string

Filename: topic/index.php

Line Number: 150

HOW EARLY EFFORTSAT DEVELOPINGA COUNTERINTELLIGENCEPROGRAMINTHE 1950s AND 1960s INFLUENCED CURRENT USCOUNTERINTELLIGENCE POLICIESA Master ThesisSubmitted to the FacultyofAmerican Public University SystembyAlexgardo OrriolaIn Partial Fulfillment of theRequirement for the DegreeofMaster of ArtsAugust 2020American Public University SystemCharles Town, WVviTheauthorhereby grantsthe American PublicUniversity System the right todisplay these contentsfor educational purposes.Theauthorassumestotalresponsibility formeetingthe requirementsset by UnitedStates copyrightlawfor the inclusionofany materialsthatare not the author’screation or in the public domain.© Copyright2020by Alexgardo OrriolaAll rights reserved.DEDICATIONI dedicate thisthesisto God, my wife, mom, and daughters’ Jazirah and Viktoria, for providing me with unfailing support and continuous encouragement throughout my years of study and through the process of researching and writing this thesisWithouttheirpatience, understanding, and, mostof all, love, thecompletion ofthiswork wouldnot have been possible. Thank you.ACKNOWLEDGMENTSI wishtothank themembersofthe American Military University for theirsupport, patience, andgood humor. Theirgentle butfirm direction hasbeenmostappreciated.Dr. Charles Russo was particularly helpful in guiding me towardacompetitive thesis.His interestinasense ofcompetence was the impetusformy research.Finally, I wouldlike to thankmy major professor,Dr. KeithLudwick.From the beginning,hehadconfidence in my abilitiestonotonly complete adegree, but tocomplete itwithexcellence.I havefoundmy coursework throughout the intelligencestudies program tobe stimulatingandthoughtful, providing me withthe toolswithwhichtoexplorebothpastand presentideasandissues.ABSTRACTOF THETHESISHOW EARLY EFFORTSAT DEVELOPINGA COUNTERINTELLIGENCEPROGRAMINTHE 1950s AND 1960s INFLUENCED CURRENT USCOUNTERINTELLIGENCE POLICIESbyAlexgardo OrriolaAmericanPublic University System, DateCharlesTown, West VirginiaProfessor KeithLudwick,ThesisProfessorThis thesis describes the need for an ethical standard in counterintelligence (CI) so as to facilitate collaboration among the various CI agencies. It conducts an analysis of the formation of the counterintelligence program under Angleton, the use of CI within the Federal Bureau of Narcotics under Anslinger, and the use of CI in the Phoenix Program and the FBI’s COINTELPRO. This analysis is used to highlight what went wrong with counterintelligence and how those problems can be prevented in the future. It uses a combination of conflict theory, structural functionalism and critical theory to explore the dimensions of counterintelligence from a comparative case study approach. The aim of this qualitative research is to provide an ethical framework that could be used to help the various USIC members of the counterintelligence enterprise collaborate more effectively. The suggested ethical framework is one of virtue ethics, with character education becoming a part of agent training, and the development of a character-based culture rather than a Cold War-based culture being implemented in the CI community. The findings of this thesis suggest that a virtue ethics framework is needed in the CI community so as to prevent conflicts of interest and constitutional abuses, to promote character development among agents and officers, and to provide moral guidance that is sorely lacking.TABLE OF CONTENTSCHAPTER PAGEI. INTRODUCTION……………………………………………………………………1II. LITERATURE REVIEW…………………………………………………………….9The Problematic Nature of Deception..........………………………………………....9Deceptive Policy.....…………………………………………………………………13The Role of Ethics.......………………………………………………………………15Framework for Analyzing the Past...……………………………..…………………18The Need for Collaboration and Clarity….…………………………………………21Summation..........……………………………………………………………………23III. METHODOLOGY…………………………………………………………………..25IV. FINDINGS & ANALYSIS………………………………………………………….31The Phoenix Program and the FBI’s COINTELPRO..............................…………..34CI in the FBN...……………………………………………………………………..39Discussion......………………………………………………………………………42Ethical Perspectives...………………………………………………………………43Structural Functionalism, Conflict Theory and Critical Theory……………………45Ethical Framework to Apply......……………………………………………………52V. CONCLUSION…………..…………………………………………………………57REFERENCES……..………………………………………………………………59CHAPTER ONEINTRODUCTIONIntelligence and counterintelligence operations have always been a part of the American Republic (Federation of American Scientists 1996). General Washington was aware of the threat of foreign espionage and the need to counter it (Wettering 2000, 165). The need to deceive those whose intention is to deceive one’s nation is, in fact, an ancient one, identified by Sun Tzu thousands of years ago (Select Committee on Intelligence 1986). Practicing deception while remaining free from the corrupting influences of deceivers has proven to be a challenge, however (Valentine 2016, 45). The circumstances under which counterintelligence in the US was formally developed and pursued in its infancy, childhood, and adolescence could be said to have predicted what that program would become in its adulthood. Abuses, errors and mistakes were so rampant that the Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) counterintelligence program, run by James Jesus Angleton from inception…

[…… parts of this paper are missing, click here to view the entire document ]

…HOWEARLYEFFORTSATDEVELOPINGACOUNTERINTELLIGENCEPROGRAMINTHE1950sAND1960sINFLUENCEDCURRENTUSCOUNTERINTELLIGENCEPOLICIESAMasterThesisSubmittedtotheFacultyofAmericanPublicUniversitySystembyAlexgardoOrriolaInPartialFulfillmentoftheRequirementfortheDegreeofMasterofArtsAugust2020AmericanPublicUniversitySystemCharlesTown,WVviTheauthorherebygrantstheAmericanPublicUniversitySystemtherighttodisplaythesecontentsforeducationalpurposes.TheauthorassumestotalresponsibilityformeetingtherequirementssetbyUnitedStatescopyrightlawfortheinclusionofanymaterialsthatarenottheauthor’screationorinthepublicdomain.©Copyright2020byAlexgardoOrriolaAllrightsreserved.DEDICATIONIdedicatethisthesistoGod,mywife,mom,anddaughters’JazirahandViktoria,forprovidingmewithunfailingsupportandcontinuousencouragementthroughoutmyyearsofstudyandthroughtheprocessofresearchingandwritingthisthesisWithouttheirpatience,understanding,and,mostofall,love,thecompletionofthisworkwouldnothavebeenpossible.Thankyou.ACKNOWLEDGMENTSIwishtothankthemembersoftheAmericanMilitaryUniversityfortheirsupport,patience,andgoodhumor.Theirgentlebutfirmdirectionhasbeenmostappreciated.Dr.CharlesRussowasparticularlyhelpfulinguidingmetowardacompetitivethesis.Hisinterestinasenseofcompetencewastheimpetusformyresearch.Finally,Iwouldliketothankmymajorprofessor,Dr.KeithLudwick.Fromthebeginning,hehadconfidenceinmyabilitiestonotonlycompleteadegree,buttocompleteitwithexcellence.Ihavefoundmycourseworkthroughouttheintelligencestudiesprogramtobestimulatingandthoughtful,providingmewiththetoolswithwhichtoexplorebothpastandpresentideasandissues.ABSTRACTOFTHETHESISHOWEARLYEFFORTSATDEVELOPINGACOUNTERINTELLIGENCEPROGRAMINTHE1950sAND1960sINFLUENCEDCURRENTUSCOUNTERINTELLIGENCEPOLICIESbyAlexgardoOrriolaAmericanPublicUniversitySystem,DateCharlesTown,WestVirginiaProfessorKeithLudwick,ThesisProfessorThisthesisdescribestheneedforanethicalstandardincounterintelligence(CI)soastofacilitatecollaborationamongthevariousCIagencies.ItconductsananalysisoftheformationofthecounterintelligenceprogramunderAngleton,theuseofCIwithintheFederalBureauofNarcoticsunderAnslinger,andtheuseofCIinthePhoenixProgramandtheFBI’sCOINTELPRO.Thisanalysisisusedtohighlightwhatwentwrongwithcounterintelligenceandhowthoseproblemscanbepreventedinthefuture.Itusesacombinationofconflicttheory,structuralfunctionalismandcriticaltheorytoexplorethedimensionsofcounterintelligencefromacomparativecasestudyapproach.TheaimofthisqualitativeresearchistoprovideanethicalframeworkthatcouldbeusedtohelpthevariousUSICmembersofthecounterintelligenceenterprisecollaboratemoreeffectively.Thesuggestedethicalframeworkisoneofvirtueethics,withcharactereducationbecomingapartofagenttraining,andthedevelopmentofacharacter-basedcultureratherthanaColdWar-basedculturebeingimplementedintheCIcommunity.ThefindingsofthisthesissuggestthatavirtueethicsframeworkisneededintheCIcommunitysoastopreventconflictsofinterestandconstitutionalabuses,topromotecharacterdevelopmentamongagentsandofficers,andtoprovidemoralguidancethatissorelylacking.TABLEOFCONTENTSCHAPTERPAGEI.INTRODUCTION……………………………………………………………………1II.LITERATUREREVIEW…………………………………………………………….9TheProblematicNatureofDeception..........………………………………………....9DeceptivePolicy.....…………………………………………………………………13TheRoleofEthics.......………………………………………………………………15FrameworkforAnalyzingthePast...……………………………..…………………18TheNeedforCollaborationandClarity….…………………………………………21Summation..........……………………………………………………………………23III.METHODOLOGY…………………………………………………………………..25IV.FINDINGS&ANALYSIS………………………………………………………….31ThePhoenixProgramandtheFBI’sCOINTELPRO..............................…………..34CIintheFBN...……………………………………………………………………..39Discussion......………………………………………………………………………42EthicalPerspectives...………………………………………………………………43StructuralFunctionalism,ConflictTheoryandCriticalTheory……………………45EthicalFrameworktoApply......……………………………………………………52V.CONCLUSION…………..…………………………………………………………57REFERENCES……..………………………………………………………………59CHAPTERONEINTRODUCTIONIntelligenceandcounterintelligenceoperationshavealwaysbeenapartoftheAmericanRepublic(FederationofAmericanScientists1996).GeneralWashingtonwasawareofthethreatofforeignespionageandtheneedtocounterit(Wettering2000,165).Theneedtodeceivethosewhoseintentionistodeceiveone’snationis,infact,anancientone,identifiedbySunTzuthousandsofyearsago(SelectCommitteeonIntelligence1986).Practicingdeceptionwhileremainingfreefromthecorruptinginfluencesofdeceivershasproventobeachallenge,however(Valentine2016,45).ThecircumstancesunderwhichcounterintelligenceintheUSwasformallydevelopedandpursuedinitsinfancy,childhood,andadolescencecouldbesaidtohavepredictedwhatthatprogramwouldbecomeinitsadulthood.Abuses,errorsandmistakesweresorampantthattheCentralIntelligenceAgency’s(CIA)counterintelligenceprogram,runbyJamesJesusAngletonfrominceptioninthe1950stothe1970s,effectivelyhadtobereconstructedbyColby,facingpressurefromCongressandthepublic(ChurchCommittee1976,171).Theproblemofethicsincounterintelligenceisonethattothisdayhasyettobeadequatelyanswered.However,byunderstandingwhatcounterintelligencewasinthebeginning,onemaybebettersituatedtounderstandwhatitistodayandwhyitspoliciesarethewaytheyare.Bylearningfromthemistakesmadeinthepast,abetterfoundationcanbesetinplaceforthefuture.BothAngletonandtheerainwhichthecounterintelligenceprogramwasformerlyorganizedshapedthenatureofcounterintelligenceatatimewhenthenationitselfwasbucklingunderthestressofparanoia,anger,frustrationandmistrust(Valetine2016,23;Wettering2000,165).Tosomedegree,thenationhasneverrecoveredfromthestressesofthepost-warclimatethatbirthedthecounterintelligenceprograminAmerica(Valentine2016,9).WhenDirectorColbydismissedAngletonfromhispositionasheadofcounterintelligenceattheCIA,Colbyinheritedastaffthatwas,bythattime,afull-grown“adult.”Facingpolitical,social,andeconomicpressures,theCIAwascompelledtoreorganize,andastheChurchCommitteereported,itwas“anendofanerainCIAcounterintelligence”(ChurchCommittee1976,171).Yet,theconsequencesofthateraremained.ThestructurethatAngletonhadcreatedandthenatureofcounterintelligenceitselfhadalreadycomeintobeing,muchlikeFrankenstein’smonster.VictorFrankensteinrejectedhisowncreation,butthatdidnotmeanthecreationceasedtoexist.Infact,thecreationwentontodestroythecreator.Suchanominousanalogymaybeappropriate,atleastaccordingtoWettering(2000),theretiredCentralIntelligenceAgencyoperationsofficerwhooversawclandestineoperationsinEuropeandAfricaformorethanthreedecades.DirectorColbycertainlyfeltasmuchinthe1970swhenitbecameapparentthatthechildthefederalgovernmenthadrearedintoadulthoodwasnotexactlywhatthestatehadhopedfor.TheChurchCommitteenotedthatby1976theissuesfacingthecounterintelligenceprogramwere“howbesttoprotecttheUnitedStates,includingtheproperdegreeofcompartmentationofCI[Counterintelligence]information,methodsofoperation,approachestosecurity,researchpriorities,extentofliaisoncooperation,andemphasisondeceptionactivities”(ChurchCommittee1976,172).OnedominantissuetheSenateuncoveredwasthelackofcooperationamongthevariousagenciesonthecounterintelligencefront(Wettering2000,270).ThetensionbetweentheCIAandtheFederalBureauofInvestigation(FBI)hadbeenhighsincetheformer’sbirth,andwhilethetwoagenciescouldboastofacollaborativespiritinthe1970s,thelackofanysubstantialcounterintelligenceofficeintheFBImeantthatthebulkoftheworkwascoordinatedbytheCIA.WilliamEvanina,directoroftheNationalCounterintelligenceandSecurityCenter,hasgonesofarastowarnthatthechallengeofcounterintelligenceisnolongeronethegovernmentcanaddressonitsown,thattheprivatesectormustbearsomeoftheburdenandweightofprotectingdataandensuringdigitalsecurityinthefaceofsnoopingforeignactors(Nakashima2020).AnadditionalconsiderationputforwardbyTromblay(2017)isthattechnologyhasdevelopedrapidlyinthelasttwodecadesalone,andthecounterintelligenceprogramhasbeenslowtocrossthegenerationaldividebetweenitselfandthedigitalnativesofthe21stcenturywhohavegrownupusingtechnology.Inresponsetotheriseofnew,globaltechnologicaladvances,thecounterintelligenceprogramhasappearedmuchlikeamemberofanoldergenerationattemptingtocatchuponwhatmembersofyoungergenerationstakeforgranted.Tromblay(2017)callsittheproblemofcounterintelligence’sreactionaryorientation—acharacteristicoftheprogramthatwasdefinedbythecircumstancesofitsbirth.Moreover,withsomuchdatanowinthehandsofprivateindustry,thereisanincreasedneedforcounterintelligencetoworkmorecloselywithprivateindustry.Intelligenceoperationshavealwaysincludedworkwithinprivateindustry,but,inmanycases,thisworkwascompromisedbyconflictsofinterest(Valentine2016,40).ResearchQuestionandPurposeTheresearchquestionis:HowcantheUSCounterintelligenceenterprisesupportcollaborationamongthevariousUnitedStatesIntelligenceCommunity(USIC)membersinanethicalandproductivemanner?Tounderstandtheissuesandpoliciesofcounterintelligencetoday,itisworthexaminingandidentifyingthemistakesandlessonsthatcanbelearnedfromthepastwhenthecounterintelligenceprogramformallybeganunderAngleton.ThepurposeofthisstudyistoproposeastandardizedethicalframeworkforguidingthecounterintelligenceprogramsothatthevariousagenciesinCIcanmorallyoperateaccordingtotheirmandate.Thisresearchisbeneficialtotheacademiccommunitybecauseitaddressesalong-standingissueofethicsinintelligencework.Academicshaveoftendebatedthematterbuthavenotusedcomparativecasestudyanalysistoseewhytheproblemofethicshastobeaddressedorhowthatproblemcanbebestaddressed.ThisthesisbringsattentiontotherootoftheissuebyexamininghowandwhyalackofethicalguidelinesinCIprevailed.Itishelpfultofirstdefinetheconcepts,theoriesandsystemsofethicsthatwillbediscussedinthisstudy.ConflictTheoryMarxismistherootofconflicttheory,butRalfDahrendorfpromotedconflicttheorybycomparingittostructuralfunctionalismandarguingthatsocietieshavetwoorientationsor‘twofaces”(RitzerandStepinsky2017,120).Onefacesuggestscooperation,consensusandagreement;theotherfacesuggestsconflictbetweenaclasswithpowerandaclasswithout.Theconflictbetweenthesetwofacesiswhatexplains,accordingtothistheory,theactionsofindividualsandinstitutions.CounterintelligenceBellaby(2012)definescounterintelligenceas“anyactionoractivitythatisknowinglydesignedandintendedtoencourageanaudienceofsomesorttobelieveinsomethingwhichisuntrue”(147).Typically,counterintelligence(CI)isassociatedwithmisleadingordupinganadversarysoastopreventthatadversaryfromgainingacrucialadvantageoverone’sownposition.CIisasimportantintheprivatesectorasitisinthepublicsectortoday,asinformationhasbecomeavitalresourceinthedigitalage.CriticalTheoryCriticaltheorystemsfromthepost-MarxistviewthattherevolutionpredictedbyMarxfailedtooccurbecauseofculturalfactorsandinstitutionsthatpreventedtheclasswithoutpowerfromfulfillingtheirMarxistmandate.Thistheoryexploresthereasonsandwaysthecultureofthosewithpowerisusedtopreventthosewithoutpowerfromrisinguptochallengethosewithpower(Horkheimer1972).ThetheoryassumesthatMarxwascorrectinpredictingaworkeruprising.DutyEthicsKantputforwardtheconceptofdeontology,alsoknownasdutyethics.Theconceptisthatmoralityisdeterminedbytheextenttowhichonedoesone’sdutyofstate(Messilbrook2013).Dutycanbedictatedbyanauthority,andthatiswhycounterintelligencehasbeendescribedasadutyinthepast(PfaffandTiel2004).Thelinebetweendutytostateandpersonalambition,however,hasbeencrossedinnumerabletimesthroughoutthehistoryofcounterintelligence(Morley2017;Valentine2016).Thismakesdeontologyacomplicatedframeworkwithseriouslimitationsintermsofutilityandapplication.EthicalEgoismEthicalegoismisthenotionthattheendsjustifythemeans,andsolongasonecanidentifyapersonalbenefittowhatonedoes,itcanbemorallyjustified.Essentially,itgoesagainstthenotionofKant’sdeontologybyadvocatingsubjectivedesireoverexternalduty(O’Neill1989).However,Sheppard(2012)explainsthattheworldofdeceptionthatrunsthroughcounterintelligencealignswiththe“generaltenorofethicalegoism”(19).Sheppard’s(2012)suggestionimpliesthatanunhealthysubjectivecharacteranimatestheCIcommunity.LockeanEthicsLocke’sviewwasthatlibertyisthefundamentallawofnatureandthatthestateshouldpreservelibertyinsofarasitisable(Pettit1997).Lockeanethicsasasystemdoesnotexistotherthanintheadvocacyoffreedomforaction.Thisisaproblematicethicalframeworkbecauseitcanbranchoffintwodirectionsatonce—onewaytoutilitarianisminwhichlibertyiscurbedonlybytheutilitytothecommongood;theotherwaytoethicalegoisminwhichtheendsjustifythemeans.StructuralFunctionalismStructuralfunctionalismisatheorythatexplainssocialorganizationintermsofhowrelationshipsandinstitutionsworktogethertobringstabilityandfunctionalitytoacommunity(RitzerandStepinsky2017).Ratherthanidentifyingtheproblematicnatureoftheserelationshipsandhowoppressionmayfigureintotheequation,thistheoryidentifiesthepositiveaspectsoftheserelationships.Itsinversetheoreticalapproachcouldbecalledconflicttheory.UtilitarianEthicsUtilitarianismdefinesmoralactionasthatwhichhasthegreatestcommongood(Carson2010).However,ithasnoframeworkfordefiningthe“good”—unlikeinthesystemofvirtueethics,whichassociatesthe“good”withtranscendentalidealsthatformaperson’scharacterastheyarepursuedinthoughtandaction.VirtueEthicsAlsoknownascharacterethics,virtueethicsisnotuniquetotheWestbutwasembracedequallyintheEastforthousandsofyears.IntheWest,itdatesbacktoAristotle,intheEast,toConfucius(Slingerland2011).Thebasicideaofvirtueethicsisthatactionsaredeemedmoraliftheycontributetothecultivationanddevelopmentofone’scharacter.Characterandreputationgotogetherasindividualsinsocietyjudgeoneanotherbasedonreputation,whichservesastheindicatoroftheperson’scharacter.Astatethathastarnisheditsreputationthroughbadfaithinteractionssignalsanuntrustworthycharacterandthusrisksexclusionfromalargernetworkofinternationalcollaboration(Mattox2002).ChapterOutlineThisthesisfirstprovidesareviewofliteraturethatfocusesonfourthemes:theproblematicnatureofdeception,theroleofethicsinCI,theneedforaframeworkforanalyzingtheworkofCIinthepast,andthelackofclarityandcollaborationintheCIcommunity.Thethirdchapterdiscussesthemethodologyusedforthisresearch.Thefourthchapterpresentsthefindings,andthefifthchapterdiscussesthefindings.CHAPTERTWOLITERATUREREVIEWTheaimofthisexaminationoftheliteratureistofillthewidegapthatremainsincounterintelligenceresearchregardinganappropriateethicalstandardthatcanguideandfosteranethicalculture,ascalledforbyBellaby(2012)andValentine(2016).Thepurposeofthisreviewistoidentifythelessonsthathavebeenlearnedandpresentedbyresearchersonthistopicandtoidentifyanappropriatetheoreticalframeworkforassessingthewayforward.Theresearchquestionforthisstudyis:HowcantheUScounterintelligenceenterprisesupportcollaborationamongthevariousUSICmembersinanethicalandproductivemanner?Theultimatepurposeofthisstudyistoproposeastandardizedethicalframeworkforguidingthecounterintelligenceprogramasitworkstofulfillitsmandateinthe21stcentury.Therefore,thethemesthisreviewexaminesare:1)theproblematicnatureofdeceptioninintelligencework;2)theroleofethicsincounterintelligence;3)aframeworkforanalyzingthepast;and4)theneedforclarityandcollaborationincounterintelligenceeffortsamongthevariousagencies,organizationsandactors.TheProblematicNatureofDeceptionDeceptionisatthecoreofcounterintelligence:yet,itisaproblematiccorebecauseofthecorruptionassociatedwithdeceptioninethicalsystems.Mattox(2002),forexample,observedthatthepracticeofdeception“issubjecttolimitationsimposedbythedemandsofmorality”(4).Mattox(2002)makesthegoodpointthatintelligenceprofessionalsmust“actingoodfaithevenwiththosewhoaretheiradversaries”(4).Yet,thispointisnotsupportedbyallresearchersincludingCohen(2016),whoarguesthattherearenomorallimitsonmilitarydeception.Mattox(2002)makesabetterargumentfornumerousreasons:first,hesupportshisargumentwithamoralframeworkthatisjustifiablebasedonlong-termresults,whichMattox(2002)callsthelimitationoflong-termnegativeeffects.Whendeceptionisusedcautiouslyandmorally,theadversaryismorewillingtoacceptitasanormofstateconflict;moreover,theadversary,whomaybecomeastateallyinthefuture,willnotholdanyill-willonthisaccount(Mattox2002).Butwhenmorallimitsareoff,asCohen(2016)suggestsshouldbethecase,thereisnofoundationforfuturetrust.Cohen’s(2016)argumentfailsbecauseitisbasedonazero-sumgameapproachtostatecraft:Cohen(2016)doesnotanticipatetherealityoftheveryrealpossibilityofandneedforcollaborationandpartnershipwithstatesthatareadversariestodaybutpotentialalliesinthefuture.Cohen(2016)implicitlyviewstheentireactofcounterintelligencefromthestandpointofethicalegoism,whichishighlyproblematicbothfromarationalandethicalstandpointbutalsofromapoliticalstandpoint(Lyons1976).PartofthereasonforCohen’s(2016)problematicpositioniscultural:Cohen(2016)comesfromaJewishtraditionofrevolutionarybehaviorinwhichdominanceisalwaystheendgoal(Jones2008).Othercultures,bothWesternandEastern,havetendedtopromoteapositionofstatecraftthatisinlinewiththedoctrineofmutualbeneficenceputforwardbyAdamSmithinWealthofNations.BothWesternandEasternculturesdevelopedthefirstandmostfundamentalethicalframeworkinvirtueethics,withAristotlesummarizingtheframeworkinancientGreeceandConfuciussummarizingtheframeworkinancientChinathousandsofyearsago(Hursthouse2016).Cohen’s(2016)positionisnotrootedinsuchatraditionbutratherinthetraditionofelitismthathastendedtocharacterizesomenations’approachestostatecraftinthemodernera.Withoutimposingmoralconditionsoncounterintelligence,thepossibilityofdevelopingtrustingrelationshipsinthefutureislost.Cohen(2016)hasnoanswertothisbecausehisviewiscoloredbyazero-sumgamementality,whichisthatallthatmattersiswinning.Cohen’s(2016)viewalignswellwiththeformermottooftheMossad,“Thoushaltmakewarbywayofdeception”(OstrovskyandHoy1991,1).ThefactthattheMossadabandonedthismottoafterotherstatesexpressedtheirdispleasurewithitprovesthepointthatMattox(2002)makes:statesmustbeconsciousofthemorallimitsofdeception.TheMossadsteppedbackfromtheiroverteffronteryintermsofwavingtheirno-limits-to-our-deceptioninthefaceoftheworld;but,ofcourse,Israeliintelligenceneverstoppedintermsofpractice,whichiswhynationsthatsupportamulti-polarworld,likeRussia,Syria,IranandChina,areoftenatoddswithIsraeliaims(Kent2019).Israel,liketheUS,isfocusedprimarilyonazero-sumgamestrategy(Kent2019).Mattox(2002)atleastapproachestheissueofmorallimitstodeceptionfromapractical,universal,politicalanddiplomaticpositionthathasutilitarian,deontologicalandevenvirtueethicselementstoit.TheoppositepositionofCohen(2016)canonlybeacceptedfromanethicalegoismpointofview,andethicalegoismisthemostrelativeandleasteffectiveethicalposition,aspointedoutbyLyons(1976).Unfortunately,moralitywithintherealmofmoderncounterintelligenceisoftenthefirstcasualty,ashistoryshows(Valentine2016).TheofficialbeginningsofcounterintelligenceundertheleadershipofJamesJesusAngletonhaveillustratedtheextenttowhichtheartofdeceptioncancreateproblemswithintheintelligencecommunity(Morley2017,69).Withinthiscommunityitself,thereisnostandardethicalframeworkapplied,butthereshouldbe(BaileyandGalich2012,77).Tomakemattersworse,incounterintelligence,thereisevenlessemphasisonethicalcohesion,asValentine(2016),Unkefer(2013),andPfaffandTiel(2004)pointout.Iftherewereamoreunified,standardizedmoralframeworkappliedthroughoutcounterintelligence,itislikelythatitshistoryintheUSwouldbelessfraughtwithconflictsofinterest,humanfailings,ulteriormotives,problematicrelationships,andquestionabletactics.Thereasonsuchaframeworkhasnotbeenappliedisthatitisviewedasrestrictiveandinapplicableintheworldofcounterintelligence.IntheAmericanintelligencefield,thepositionlikethatofCohen(2016)hasprevailed.Thispositionisbadforcounterintelligencebecauseoftheproblemsthatarise.Valentine(2016)detailstheseproblemsverywellinhisworkonabuseswithintheCIA,FBNandFBI.Unkefer’s(2013)memoirofcounterintelligenceintheFBNsupportsValentine’sclaimsandshowshowdangerousandcorruptingthelackofmorallimitsondeceptioncanbe.Theirworkprovidesamplesupportformorallimitationstodeception.Yet,thissupportisslowincomingbecauseopponentsofsuchaviewarguethatthesystemworksasis.Indeed,Unkefer(2013)admitsasmuch,reluctantly—buthedoesalsoraisethequestionofwhethertheendsjustifythemeans.Itisaquestionthatneedstobeasked,andthatgoesbacktotheissueofwhetherethicalegoismisasufficientmoralframeworkforcounterintelligence.Valentine(2016)makesthebestargumentforwhyitisnot:thedamagetoAmericanideals,America’sreputation,Americandiplomacyandpolitics,andAmericancultureistoogreat.Counterintelligencehasoftenbeenlinkedwiththeideaofnationalsecurity,yetasNolan(1997)shows,itisdangeroustothinkofcounterintelligenceasasecurityexercisebecauseitisliterallynothingofthesort.Writingfromthestandpointofprivateindustry,Nolan(1997)statesexplicitlythat“whilesecurityseekstoprotectafirm\'sassetsbyacombinationofpolicies,proceduresandpractices,counterintelligence,properlyunderstood,aimstoengageandneutralizeacompetitor\'scollectioneffortsthroughavarietyofimaginative,flexible,andactivemeasures”(53).Thepointofconcern,here,isnotonlythedegreetowhichthose“imaginative,flexible,andactivemeasures”leadtotheproblemsbothfortheagencyandforthefielditaimstoserve(Nolan1997,53).Thereisalsothematterofconfusingcounterintelligencewithsecurity,whichispreciselywhathashappenedinthepastandiscurrentlyhappeningundertheTrumpAdministrationwithits2020-2022NationalCounterintelligenceStrategy.Thefactthatcounterintelligencehasbeenconflatedwithsecurityispartoftheproblem:ithasledtoakindofself-deceptionwiththegovernment.Itisnosecretthatself-deceptionweakensone’sabilitytoengageincounterintelligenceeffectively(Unkefer2013),andeventheancientartofwarpracticedbySunTzusuggestsasmuch.AmericanpolicyoncounterintelligencehasnotbeendevelopedwiththeimportantwarningfromNolan(1997)inmind.Instead,ithasbeenformulatedwithaviewtowardsremovingallmorallimitsandconstraintsoncounterintelligenceandrecommittingitselftothepursuitofvictoryinthezero-sumgamepolicymakerswishtoseethenationplaying.DeceptivePolicyItishelpfultoconsiderhowself-deceptiveAmericanpolicyhasbecometoillustratetheimportantpointsthatNolan(1997),Mattox(2002)andValentine(2016)make.Forinstance,thestrategicobjectivesofthe2020-2022NationalCounterintelligenceStrategyoftheUnitedStates(2020)are:1)toprotectthenation’scriticalinfrastructure,2)reducethreatstosupplychains,3)countertheexploitationoftheUSeconomy,4)defendAmericandemocracyagainstforeigninfluence,and5)counterforeignintelligencecyberandtechnicaloperations(4).Theseobjectivesdifferfromthe2018-2022NationalCounterintelligenceandSecurityCenterStrategicPlan.UnderDirectorWilliamR.Evanina,integrationofCIandsecurityactivitieswasatoppriorityandthemeofthe2018-2022strategy,butthestrategicgoalswerequitedistinct:Goal1wasto“AdvanceourKnowledgeof,andourAbilitytoCounterForeignandotherThreatsandIncidents”;Goal2wasto“ProtectUSCriticalInfrastructure,Technologies,Facilities,ClassifiedNetworks,SensitiveInformation,andPersonnel”;Goal3wasto“AdvanceourCounterintelligenceandSecurityMissionandOptimizeEnterpriseCapabilitiesthroughPartnerships”;Goal4wasto“StrengthenourEffectivenessthroughStakeholderEngagement,Governance,andAdvocacy”;andGoal5wasto“AchieveourMissionthroughOrganizationalExcellence”(NationalCounterintelligenceandSecurityCenterStrategy2018-20202020,ii).Thedifferencerevealstheissueofmissioncreep—thegradualblurringoflines,blurringofobjectives,expansionofmeanings,andtakinglibertieswithoriginalmandates.Itshouldbeconsidered,afterall,thattheofficialresponsibilityofcounterintelligenceisto“collectinformationandconductactivitiestoidentify,deceive,exploit,disrupt,orprotectagainstespionage,otherintelligenceactivities,sabotage,orassassinationsconductedfororonbehalfofforeignpowers,organizations,orpersonsortheiragents,orinternationalterroristorganizations”(NationalCounterintelligenceandSecurityCenterStrategy2018-20202020,2).Theconflated,mixed,broad,andsomewhatvaguestrategicobjectivesthathavebeendevelopedforthecounterintelligencecommunityintheyear2020reflectsthesameconflated,mixed,broad,andsomewhatvaguestrategicobjectivesthatplaguedtheCIcommunity’sPhoenixprogram,whichValentine(2016)hascalledthe“blueprint”forallcurrentintelligenceaction(50).Tromblay(2017)hasconcurredwiththeassessmentthattheintelligencecommunityisoverstretchedandovertaxedandthatcounterintelligenceisbeingtaskedwithtoomanyobjectivesthatareforeigntoitsmission.TheissuesidentifiedbyTromblay(2017)arethat“theU.S.governmenthasattemptedtopartnerwiththeprivatesectoroncounterintelligence(CI)awarenessandresponse,[butthat]theseeffortshavebeenplaguedbyalimitedconceptofwhichindustrysectorsareatrisk,inconsistencyinprograms,andredundanciesacrossagencies”(1).Overall,thereisalackofreconciliationbetweenvisionandmissionandwhatisbeingaskedofCI.Itappearsthatpolicymakersareeitherunclearaboutthelimitationsofcounterintelligenceworkorarenotinterestedintheselimitationsandseekamoreexpansiveuseofcounterintelligence,i.e.,tousedeceptiontobolstersecurity—againstthewarningsofNolan(1997).Ineithercase,itisaneffortinself-deceptionthatwilllikelyonlyleadtomoreproblemsfortheCIcommunity.Tosummarizetheproblem,theareaofactionforcounterintelligencemaybeonethingintermsofamission,butthestrategicoperationsandintegrationofcounterintelligencewithsecurityandotherstate-sanctionedactionshasrefueledandthreatenstoperpetuatethesameproblemsthatledtotheChurchCommittee’s(1976)conclusionthattheCIAhadcreatedacounterintelligencemonster(172).WhileitisacknowledgedthattheCIcommunityshouldworkmorecloselywithprivateindustrytoengageeffectivelyinitsofficialmission(Nakashima2020),therealityofhowthiscollaborationistotakeplace,ethicallyandpractically,isaproblemthatremainstobeaddressed.TheriskofnotaddressingitputstheCIcommunityindangerofoperatingoutsideofitsscopeandengaginginthepreciseproblematicmisinterpretationofcounterintelligencewarnedagainstbyNolan(1997).Nolan’s(1997)warningisimportanttoconsider,butithasbeenlargelyignoredbecausetheframeworkofethicalegoismhasbeenadoptedfromthebeginningunderAngleton,whoworkedcloselywiththeMossadfromthestartofCIoperations(Morley2017).Morley(2017)doesanexcellentjobofidentifyingthecloserelationshipbetweenAngletonandTelAviv,arelationshipignoredbymostotherresearchers.UnderstandingthisrelationshipisimportantbecauseitrevealstheculturalinfluencethatIsraeliintelligencehadonAngleton.RatherthanrootingCIinthestrongmoralfoundationsoftheWest(virtueethics,deontologyorutilitarianism),AngletonadoptedtheethicalegoismframeworkoftheMossad,andthathasmadeallthedifference.TheRoleofEthicsOneoftheproblemsencounteredinstudyingcounterintelligenceishowtoapproachitfromanethicalpointofview(PfaffandTiel,2004).Defininganethicalframeworkisessentialinapproachingthesubject,yetproblematicatthesametimebecausecounterintelligencehasnotbeenapproachedinthesamewaybythosewhopracticedorcontinuetopracticeit.BaileyandGalich(2012)makeaveryeffectiveargumentforwhyamoretraditionalanddefinedethicalframeworkisneededinCI.PfaffandTiel(2004)explainthatcurrentlythereisalackofethicalfocusinCI,butBaileyandGalich(2012)gettotherootofthematter:noagenciesinCIappeartobeinterestedinsettingmorallimitationstothepracticeofCI.WhilevarioustheoreticalassumptionshavebeenappliedtocriticalstudiesoftheCIcommunityinthepast,noneofthesestudieshaveactuallygonesofarastorecommendanethicalframework.Erskine(2004)addressedtheutilitarianethicsofCI(360);PfaffandTiel(2004)arguedthateveryethicalapproachtoCIisrootedinLockeanordeontologicalethics(1-2);Mattox(2002)approachesthetopicfromthestandpointofvirtueethics,arguingthatifleadersdonot“actingoodfaithevenwiththosewhoaretheiradversaries”thepotentialriskofdamagedreputationscanunderminethediplomaticstrategiesofthestateandcreategreaterproblemsthanbefore(4).EachofthesestudiesiseffectiveinillustratingtheshortcomingsofethicalapplicationinCI,butnoneofthempresentawayforwardorasolutiontotheproblem.Eachhighlightsapartoftheproblem,butnoneofthemproposesasufficientsolution.Theproblemisreal:tosupportthepointofMattox(2002),LieberthalandJisi(2012)explainthattheallianceamongChina,Russia,andIran(allconsideredcounterintelligencetargetsinthe2020-2022NationalCounterintelligenceStrategyoftheUnitedStates)hascomeaboutasadirectresponsetotheperceptionofthesestatesthattheUShasactedinbadfaithandcannotbetrusted.Whatisthesolution?Noneofthesestudiesbythemselvesprovidesaholisticsolutionbecausetheproblemultimatelyiscultural.Tounderstandthatpoint,onehastoconsiderthetraditionalpurposeofethicsintheWestandintheEastandhowthatpurposediffersfromthemodernapproachtoethicsfromthestandpointofegoism.Researchersconsistentlysuggestthatethicsmattersinallaspectsofstatehood,nolessincounterintelligencethaninanyothersphere(Bellaby2012;Erskine2004;BaileyandGalitch2012;PfaffandTiel2004).However,therehasbeennostandardethicalframeworkusedincounterintelligence,aneedforconsistencyintheapplicationofanethicalsystemtoCImustbeassumed.BaileyandGalitch(2012)makethispointmosteffectivelybyexplainingthecodeofethicsintheintelligencecommunityandidentifyingitsweaknessesandproblemareas.However,havingacodeandimplementingacodearetwodifferentthings,andthisiswhereculturecomesintoplay.TheMossadchangeditsmottotoappeasetheworld,butitdidnotchangeitstactics.Inshort,itswordschanged,butitsactionsstayedthesame:thesamecultureremained.ThecultureintheUSiswhatmustbeaddressed,asValentine(2016)deftlyshows.Withpowerasthemainimpetus,otherdriversofhumanaction,suchasvirtueethics,dutyethics,utilitarianism,andethicalegoism,maybeusedtoexplaintheproblemsthatarosewithinthecounterintelligenceprogramfromthe1950stothe1970s.Relevanttheoriesincludeconflicttheory,structuralfunctionalism,andcriticaltheory.Conflicttheorywaspositedasaresponsetostructuralfunctionalism,andcriticaltheoryaroseoutofthefailureofconflicttheorytofullyaccountforthefailureoftheMarxistprophecy(Horkheimer1972,246).Horkheimer(1972)fillsthegapinculturalstudiesleftbyotherresearcherswhofailedtodrawtheconnectionbetweenmedia,thestate,andtheculturalaimsoftheelite.ComingfromaJewishculturalbackgroundhimself,Horkheimer(1972)understoodtherolethattheeliteplayintheformationofcultureinthemodernUSanddescribesbetterthananyoneelseinthefieldhowtheethicsofthepeoplehavebeenformedbyanelitistgroupinpower.However,byitself,criticaltheoryisaninadequatetheorybecausesocialactionismorethanaquestforliberation.Inotherwords,Horkheimer(1972)representsonlyonetypeofculture—anon-traditionalculturethatisneitherinlinewithtraditionalWesternorEasternvaluesbutratheronethathashaditsownvaluesandtraditionspredicatedonitsownspecialplaceinGod’seyesandinrelationtotherestoftheworld.Equallyinadequatebyitselfisstructuralfunctionalismbecauseitdoesnotconsidertherolethatconflictplaysinsociety.Obviously,withdifferentculturesandvaluesclashingatdifferentlevelsofsociety,therewillbeconflict.Withafocusonhowethicsplayapartindecision-making,structuralfunctionalism,conflicttheoryandcriticaltheorycanhelptoexplainthecomplexcultureofCIinAmerica.Thereisnooneresearcherwhomakesthispoint,butvariousresearchershavemadevalidargumentsindefenseoftheirowntheoreticalpositions.FrameworkforAnalyzingthePastBecauseoftheconfusionregardingculture,culturalvalues,andethics,thereisnoconsensusonhowtoanalyzethepast,asPfaffandTiel(2004)show.Nonetheless,thereisaneedforaframeworkforanalyzingthepast,becauseonlywithsuchaframeworkcanonebegintounderstandthemistakesandthelessonsthatcanbelearnedfromthepast.Todecideonthatframework,onehastodecideonwhatvaluesaremostimportant—butthisisthecruxofthematter.Beforeonecanrightlyconsidertherolethatethicsshouldplayinthefieldofcounterintelligence,onemustdecideontheculturalperspectivefromwhichtojudge.Morley(2013)illustrateshowAngletonwasinfluencedbyIsrael’scultureofstatecraft.Thoughhedoesnotemphasizethepoint,itisnecessarytodoso.ThatinfluenceiswhatisattheheartofAmerica’slackofmoralrestraintincounterintelligence.Thelackofmoralrestrainthasbeenwelldocumented(Valentine2016).TheculturalinfluenceresponsibleforthatlackhasnotreceivedmuchfocusfromresearcherslikeValentine(2016),Morley(2013)orPfaffandTiel(2004).Whethertheyhaveintentionallyturnedablindeyetoitorhavesimplypassedovertheinfluenceofcultureonthematterisunknown.Whatisknownisthat,asBellaby(2012)states,counterintelligenceis“anyactionoractivitythatisknowinglydesignedandintendedtoencourageanaudienceofsomesorttobelieveinsomethingwhichisuntrue”(147).Traffickinginuntruthscanbehighlyriskyifnotapproachedwithafirmethicalframeworkinplace.Forexample,whatareacceptablecounterintelligenceactionsandwhatunacceptablecounterintelligenceactions?Mattox(2002)assertsthatthereshouldbemorallimitsonCI,butdoesnotgointoconsiderabledetailtoexplicitlystatewhatthoselimitsshouldbe.Again,theissueofdelineationisavoidedbecauseitisanissueofcultureatroot,andculturalconflictsexistthroughoutAmericansocietyfromtoptobottom.Erskine(2004)providesaninitialsteptowardsthinkingaboutCIfromamoretraditionalethicalperspective,onethatisrealistic,consequentialistanddeontological—but,again,thesameproblemsemerge.Dutyisrelativetoone’sculturalimperativeandone’sperceivedobjective.Erskine(2004)isnotunrealisticeitherinappreciatingtheambiguousmoralnatureofCIashestatesthat“notonlyisdeceptionintrinsictoclandestinecollection,butitisalsocentraltocounter-intelligenceactivitiessuchasthedeploymentof‘doubleagents’andthesendingoffalsemessageswhenitiswewhowouldratherkeepoursecretstoourselves”(372).Erskine’s(2004)approachtowardssuggestinganethicalframeworkforexaminingthepastishelpful,butitdoesnotprovideanyconclusiveanswers.Moretothepoint,intermsofthedangerposedbyanunethicalapproachtocounterintelligence,isBellaby’s(2012)assessmentoftheunderlyingreasonforthefailurewithinthecounterintelligenceprograminthepast:theapplicationofwidespreaddeceptionrepresentsadangerforone’sownnationbecause“lyingcandamagesocietyasitchipsawayat,andcoulddestroythesocialbondsoftrustandasaresultbreaksdownthemoralandsocialrelationshipsthatholdasocietytogether”(149).ThisdangerishighlightedbyValentine(2016),whocitesthePhoenixProgram,initiatedinVietnamasatemplateforcorruptionwithintheintelligencecommunityandonethatisstillpromotedtothisday(40).Afurtherproblem,identifiedbyBaileyandGalich(2012),isthattherehasneverbeenastandardizedethicalframeworkusedwithinthecounterintelligenceprogramandthat,justasfreedomofreligioncanquicklyleadtofreedomfromreligion,freedomofchoicewithregardstoethicscanquicklyleadtofreedomfromethics.Thosewhoanalyzethepasttendtodosowithoutcommittingthemselvestoanethicalperspective.Cohen(2016)isaloneamongresearchersinthathisperspectiveisobviousevenifnotexplicit:heiselitistandethicalegoismistheframework.Otherresearchers,fromErskine(2004)toBaileyandGalich(2012),avoidmakinganyexplicitstatementsonethicalegoism.Itisalmostasthoughtheyaretryingtoavoidaconfrontation.TocalloutthepurveyorsofethicalegoisminpolicymakingintheCIcommunitywouldbeakintothrowingdownagauntletandinvitingblowback.Realizingthatiswhyitisimportanttokeepconflicttheoryinmindwhenaddressingthesepoints.Theethicalframeworkusedtoanalyzethepastmustberealistic,asErskine(2004)argues.ThatisoneofthebestpointsthatErskine(2004)makes.CIis,bynature,morallyambiguous.Thefactisthatdeceptionispartofthetradeincounterintelligence:“intelligenceprofessionalsaroundtheworldaretaughtandencouragedbytheirleadersandagenciestouseunethicaltacticsor‘tradecraft’(e.g.lie,deceive,steal,andmanipulate)inordertoobtain[crucial]information”(Coyneetal.2013,27).Thereisnowaytoavoidthisfact,andnegotiatingwithitfromanethicalstandpointputsorremoveslimitationsonhumanbehavior.Thoselimitations,moreover,canbethedifferencebetweenasuccessfulcounterintelligenceoperationandafailedoperation(Unkefer2013).ThisrealitymaybewhyresearcherslikeBaileyandGalich(2012)andErskine(2004)havebeenreluctanttoprovideanethicalframeworkfortheCIcommunity.Regardless,theirstudiesindicatetheneedforone.Toprovetheneedforsuchaframework,itishelpfultodrawuponValentine’s(2016)work,whichisfactualratherthantheoreticalliketheworkofErskine(2004)andMattox(2002).Valentine’sstudyoftheCIAfromitsinceptionisuniqueamongotherresearchers,ashewasgivenspecialaccesstoCIAagentsbyDirectorColby,andmuchoftheinformationgivenhimbyagentswasconsidered“safe”astheagentsassumedValentinewasintheCIAandwasnotgoingtopublishwhatwasbeingtoldtohim.Valentine’sreportingprovidesauniquebutpersonallookintothehistoryofintelligenceintheUS.Itdiffersfromotherstudies,suchasthatofBellaby(2012)andPfaffandTiel(2004),whicharescholarly-orientedratherthanhistoricallyoriented.Valentine’sworkservesasahistoricalrecordoferrors,mistakesandproblemswithintheintelligenceandcounterintelligenceenterpriseresultingfromalackofethicalimperatives.PfaffandTiel(2004)indicatethatessentiallytheyallcombineaspectsofdeontologyandLockeanethics,inthatthepracticeofdeceptionisperceivedasadutytothestate,onethatmustbepracticedinordertosafeguardthestate’sownsecretsandtopreventforeignactorsfromacquiringtruthfulinformationthatmightcompromiseamissioninthefield.Yet,deontologyandLockeanethicshavenotsafeguardedtheintelligencecommunityfromerrorsandabuses(PfaffandTiel,2004;Valentine,2016).TheNeedforCollaborationandClarityNotonlyhasaneedbeenidentifiedforcollaborationbetweentheCIcommunityandprivateindustry,butthereisarecognizedneedthattheglobalizedworldhaschangedthewayinwhichnationsmustinteract:morecollaborationandlessintrigueisrequired.Forexample,GodsonandWirtz(2000)statethat“thebreakdownofthetraditionalbarrierstonationalsovereignty—increasestheinformationandeconomicchannels”thatinternationalplayersmustnavigate,fosterandmaintain(432).GodsonandWirtz(2000)furtherpointoutthat“foreigndenialanddeceptionaffectsthequalityoflifeintheUnitedStatesbycausingpolicymakerstowastescarcepublicresourcesandtofailtoanticipatestrategicthreats”(435).Thispointraisesthequestionofwhetherdeceptionshouldhaveanypartinstatecraft.Kent(2019)explainsthattoboastofopenlydeceivingbyengagingincounterintelligenceistoputone’sownnationalreputationatrisk:thatisonereasontheIsraeliMossadchangeditsmotto,whichusedtostate,“Bywayof deception,thoushaltconduct war”(86).Nationsthusopenlyadmitthatengagingindeceptionisabadlook.BothKent(2019)andGodsonandWirtz(2000)helptomaketheproblemofmoralityinCIevenmorecomplicatedbyaskingifdeceptionshouldhaveanypartinpolicy.Theyrepresentonesideoftheethicalspectrum,andCohen(2016)representstheotherside.Kent(2019)andGodsonandWirtz(2000)representtheabsolutistsideofthediscussion;Cohen(2016)representstherelativisticside.Theabsolutistsideofthediscussionhasamuchbetterargumentthantherelativisticside.Thereasonforthisisthatthereisanescalationprobleminvolved,fromapracticalstandpoint.AsBernardi(2013)states,“Usually,informationcontrolgeneratesanescalationofcounterintelligencemeasures,becauseinformationcontrolonthepartofoneStateinvitesothergovernmentsandagenciestocounteract,bymeansofcountermeasuresagainstespionageanddeception”(50).Whenonenationdeceives,anotherwillfollow.Angletonfacedtheproblemofescalationhisentirecareer(Morley2013).ThisiswhytheabsolutistpositionofKent(2019)makessense,practicallyspeaking.Itmaybebettersimplytofocusoncollaborationandclaritythanonattemptingtodeceive.Ironically,itisinthiscontextthattheIntelligenceandNationalSecurityAlliance(2020)hasidentifieda“needtoclarifytheroleofCIintheeraofglobalization”(1).Yetthecultureofdeceptionhasspreadallovertheglobe.Developers,technicians,productionpersonnel,ITpersonnel,businessdevelopmentpersonnel,humanresourcespersonnel,andfacilitypersonnelareallpotentialtargetsofforeignactorsandforeigncollectorsofintelligence(NationalCounterintelligenceandSecurityCentern.d.).Privateindustryisatriskbecauseitpossessesintellectualpropertythatforeignactorscovet,andbusinessactivitiescanbeexploited.Cyberoperationsarealsoatrisk,asisconfidentialinformation,whichcanbemishandledbyemployees.Counterintelligenceoperationscouldbeusedtodeliberatelyleakfalseinformationtoknownforeignactors,butdoingsorunstheriskofescalatingalargerconflictamongnations,asBernardi(2013)notes.Bernardi(2013),liketheothers,highlightstheproblembutdoesnotpointtoasolution.Fromanethicalstandpoint,itisdifficulttodeterminewherethelineshouldbeintermsofusingdeception.Thus,onemuststepbacktothestandpointofcultureandperhapseventoabsolutisminordertoestablishtheconditionsnecessaryforcollaborationandclarity,asKent(2019)proposes.SummationSincecounterintelligencecametomaturityintheUSinaneraofconflict,itishelpfultoapproachthesubjectfromthestandpointofconflicttheoryandthetheoriesdevelopedaroundit,allofwhichfocusonthewaysinwhichpowerissoughtandusedbygroupsinordertoobtainormaintainpossessionofvitalresourcesormaintainabalanceofrelationshipsthatensurestabilityandorderinasystem.Thisapproachallowstheresearchtoexplorethewaysinwhichpowerdrovetheinitiativesofcounterintelligencepoliciesduringthe50s,60sand70s.However,theliteratureshowsthattheproblemofethicsincounterintelligencehashadnoeasysolutionandthattheartofdeceptionissuchthatitfostersagrayzoneofdisinformation,conflictsofinterestandcorruption.Theoutcomeofthissituationwasthatcounterintelligencesufferedfrompoorcultureandvariousotherissues,resultingultimatelyinthedismissalofAngletonandanattempttorestarttheprogram.Astheprogramnowtriestoaddresstheissuesofthe21stcentury,itappearsthatguidancecouldbeusedtohelpsteerthecounterintelligenceprogramawayfromthesameerrorsandpoliciesthatderaileditinthepast.Theliteraturesuggeststhataneedexistsforthisproblemtobeaddressedandtohelprespondtothatneed,atheoreticalapproachtotheproblemshouldbedefined.Thegapsintheresearchindicatethat,inspiteofawarenessamongresearchersregardingalackofethicalstandardsintheCIcommunity,thereisnoresearchthathasbeenconductedthatfocusesonestablishingasuitableethicalframework.Theproblemhasbeendebated,butasolutionhasnotbeenoffered.SomeresearchershavesuggestedthattheprevailingethicalegoismintheCIcommunityisappropriate,butthisislittlemorethanself-justification.TheholesintheresearchthatneedtobepluggedarerelatedtounderstandingwhattherootoftheethicalproblemisinCI.Toplugthoseholes,acomparativecasestudyanalysiscanhelp.CHAPTERTHREEMETHODOLOGYAcomparativecasestudyapproachisusedinthisresearch.Thecasestudyanalysisfocusesonthreeareas,inparticular,1)theuseofcounterintelligenceintheCIAundercounterintelligenceChiefJamesJesusAngleton;2)theconflationofcounterintelligencewithoutcounterinsurgencyintheFBI’sCOINTELPROandthePhoenixProgram,and3)theuseofcounterintelligencebytheFederalBureauofNarcotics(FBN).Becausethereisnostandardethicalframeworkincounterintelligence,itpresentsaproblembecauseoftheriskofsubjectiveorquestionablemoralityseepingintocounterintelligenceactivities(Valentine2016).Tounderstandtheproblem,thisresearchdesignisappropriatelyqualitative,asthesubjectisexploratoryinnature.TheaimoftheresearchistoexplorebywayofcomparativecasestudyanalysisthecounterintelligenceprogramunderJamesJesusAngleton,CIinthePhoenixProgramandtheFBI’sCOINTELPRO,andCIintheFBN.TheFBNwasfoundedin1930anddissolvedin1968duetocorruption.Itstaskwastopreventdrugtraffickingandtomakecasesagainstdrugdealersandsmugglers.Scholarlyarticles,Senatereports,memoirs,independentresearch,biographies,andanalysishaveservedasthesourcesofinformation.ThepurposeofthisapproachcanbestbeunderstoodinthelightofErikson’smodelofhumandevelopment,whichenablespsychologiststounderstandtheadultbyexaminingtheage-relatedconflictsthatmustbeovercomebeforethechildcanproceedsuccessfullytolaterstagesofdevelopment(ShrinerandShriner2014).ByexaminingtheearlystagesofcounterintelligenceunderAngleton,onemaygaininsightinunderstandingthepoliciesandissuesofcounterintelligencetodaybyexaminingtheearlydaysofthecounterintelligenceprogramasitgrewthroughitsinfancy,childhoodandadolescencestagesofthepost-war/ColdWarera(Valentine2016,10).Thisstudywillexplorehowconflictsofinterestsandrelationshipsandalackofethicalstandardsledtoproblemsincounterintelligence.Thecomparativecasestudyapproachisarobustonebecauseitallowsforthetriangulationofresearch.TheappropriatemodelforthisapproachisthatofGeorgeandBennett(2004),whichusesastructured-focusedresearchdesign.Thereisnostandardethicalframeworkincounterintelligence,whichpresentsaproblembecauseoftheriskofsubjectiveorquestionablemoralityseepingintocounterintelligenceactivities(Valentine2016).Tounderstandtheproblem,thisresearchdesignisqualitativebecausethesubjectisexploratoryinnature.TheaimoftheresearchistoexplorebywayofcomparativecasestudyanalysisthecounterintelligenceprogramunderJamesJesusAngleton,CIinthePhoenixProgramandtheFBI’sCOINTELPRO,andCIintheFBN.Scholarlyarticles,monographs,Senatereports,memoirs,independentresearch,biographies,andanalysiswillserveasthesourcesofinformation.Datawereanalyzedusingcontentanalysis,withthemesdrawnfromtheliteratureandarrangedandorganizedtogiveaclearerunderstandingofhowethicsmightbebetterutilizedtoguidethecounterintelligenceenterpriseinthe21stcentury.Conceptsofethicswereoperationalizedbydefiningtheminaccordancewithacceptedscholarlypractices.Potentialbiaseswereaddressedbybracketingthemoutatthebeginning,asrecommendedbyJohnston,Wallis,Oprescu,andGray(2017).Thecasestudyanalysisfocusesonthreeareasinparticular,1)theuseofcounterintelligenceintheCIAundercounterintelligenceChiefJamesJesusAngleton;2)theuseofcounterintelligenceinthePhoenixProgramandtheFBI’sCOINTELPRO,and3)theuseofcounterintelligencebytheFederalBureauofNarcotics.Researchmethodsforobtainingdataareimportantbecausetheydeterminethekindofdatathatiscollected.Forinstance,asurveycansupplyquantitativedatausinga5-pointLikertscalethatallowstheresearchtostatisticallyanalyzetheresultsandtestforcorrelationordescribetheaveragesandsoon.Afocusgroupmethodcanallowaresearchertoobtainqualitativedatathatfocusesoncommonthemesandconceptsfoundamongtheresponsesofthevariousparticipantsinthefocusgroupwhenaquestionisputoutforgroupdiscussion.Experimentsallowaresearchertotestahypothesisandlookatspecificvariablesandhowtheyrelate.Interviewsallowaresearchertoobtainin-depthdatafromasingleparticipantbyaskingquestionsthatcanleadtomorequestionsandmoreanswers,andsoon.Eachmethodishelpfuldependingonwhattheresearcherisattemptingtodo,andsotheyallhavetheirplaceinmeaningfulresearch(Walliman2017).Thisstudyisexploratoryandisthereforenotaimingtotestahypothesisbutrathertocomparefindingsfromthreedifferentcaseexamplesofcounterintelligenceactivities.Thecomparativecasestudyapproachreliesheavilyuponsecondarydataanalysis—i.e.,datathathasalreadybeencompiled.Forthisstudy,threeworks,inparticular,willserveasthestartingpoint:Unkefer’s(2013)memoirofworkingwiththeFBN,90Church;Morley’s(2017)biographyofAngleton,TheGhost:TheSecretLifeofCIASpymasterJamesJesusAngleton;andValentine’s(2016)collectionofresearchonthePhoenixProgramaswellastheFBN.Angleton’sCIoffice,ProjectPhoenix,theFBI’sCOINTELPRO,andtheFBNareallgoodcasesforanalysisbecauseeachprovidesauniquewindowintotheworldofCIoveraconsiderablerangeofdepartmentsanderas.Moreover,littlehaswrittenaboutthesecasesinalltheliteratureonCI.TheFBNwasselectedasacasebecauseitprovidesanearlyviewonethicsandunofficialCItactics,startingfromthe1930s,andalsobecauseonlyahandfulofresearchersandauthorshaveanalyzeditinthepastandnoneofthemfromtheperspectiveofethicsstandards.AlthoughtheFBNwaseffectivefor30yearsinstoppingdrugtraffickingintheUS,itsdissolutionrevealsaproblemofethicsatthecoreoftheBureau.ThePhoenixProgramwasselectedbecauseofitscontroversialnatureandthefactthatValentine(2016)conductedin-depthinterviewswithparticipantsintheprogram,makingitausefulcaseforpracticalpurposes.PhoenixwasimplementedinVietnamasawayofsabotagingCommunistadversariesinthefield;unlawfultactics,suchastortureandassassinationwerecommonlyused.TheFBI’sCOINTELPROhasreceivedthemostattentionamongthecasesandwasbroughtupforCongressionalreview,whichalsomakesitagoodsourceforpracticalpurposes.COINTELPROwasadomesticspyingprogramthatbreachedtheConstitutionrightsofUScitizensandbecameamajorembarrassmentfortheFBI.Angleton’sCIofficeisagoodcasebecauseitallowsforonetoseewhatkindofethicalculturewascultivatedintheCIcommunityfromthebeginning.AngletonwasthefirstchiefofcounterintelligenceintheCIAandheldthatpositionfortwodecades.Heessentiallysetthetoneforcultureandethics.Analysisoftheseworkswillthenbefollowedupandcomplementedbyanalysisofrelevantarchivaldata,gatheredbyusingsnowballsampling—i.e.,reviewingsourcesidentifiedintheoriginaldataandusingthosesourcestogatheradditionalsourcesandsoon.Secondarydataanalysisistypicallyusedinliteraturereviewsandsystematicreviewstoprovideafoundationforfurtherresearchortocompilepastinformationfromdecadesofpreviousresearchintooneresearcharticle,anditcanbeofequalimportanceincasestudyanalysis(Walliman2017).Itcanbeusedforeitherqualitativeorquantitativeresearch,andthedatacanbeinterpretedintermsofthequalityandcharacteristicsofthearchivaldataorintermsofstatistics.Itcanalsobeusedbyresearcherswhodonothavetimetoconductanexperimentorfieldworkontheirown,sotheyusedatafrompreviouslyconductedstudiesandincorporateitintotheirownstudy.Forthepurposesofthisstudy,secondarydatawillbecompiledthematicallywithaviewtowardsevaluatingcounterintelligencecaseexamplesfromthestandpointofethicsandoutcomestodeterminehowethicsmightbestbeappliedtobolstercounterintelligenceforthefuture.Theethicalperspectivesfromwhichthesecounterintelligencecaseswillbeassessedwillbe1)virtueethics,2)dutyethics,3)utilitarianism,and4)ethicalegoism.Thesearethefourmainrelevantethicalsystemstypicallyutilizedinethicsdiscoursetodiscussactionsandtheirmoralityintoday’sworld(PojmanandFeiser2012).AsPojmanandFeiser(2012)note,“moralprinciplesconcernstandardsofbehavior;roughlyspeaking,theyinvolvenotwhatisbutwhatoughttobe”(3).Thegoalofthisstudyistoidentifywhattheethicalframeworkoughttobeforthecounterintelligencecommunitygoingforward.Thismethodisconductedbycreatingasetofparametersforthesearchingofadatabase.Thesearchwillhavetohaveinclusionandexclusionparameterssoastodeterminewhatdatawillbeincludedinthestudyandwhatdatawillbeexcluded,andthisshouldbeexplainedinthewrite-up.Thedataisthenobtainedfromthedatabaseandanalyzedaccordingly.Theadvantagesofsecondarydataanalysisandarchivalstudiesarethatitisagoodwaytoreviewwhatinformationisavailableineitherpublishedorunpublishedform(Walliman2017).Itallowsdatatobeaggregatedtoonesourceandexaminedandthatinformationpresentedforothersinasystematicoratleastlogicalandorderlyway.Thelimitationsofthismethodarethatitisnotgenerallygoingtoprovideanynewinsightonasubjectoradvancearesearchissue.Itisgenerallyusedforbuildingacaseforfutureresearchortoshowwherethefocusinthepasthasbeenorwhystudiesonasubjectsofarhavebeeninadequate(Walliman2017).Sincetheaimofthisstudyisexploratoryinnatureandintendstofocusontheissueoftheapplicationofethicsincounterintelligence,thislimitationisnotseenasnegative.Purposivesamplingwillalsobeusedinconjunctionwithsnowballsamplingtoobtaindata.Purposivesamplingisacceptableforqualitativeresearchbecauseinqualitativeresearchoneisexploringaproblemratherthanattemptingtotestahypothesis(Marshall1996).Generally,inquantitativestudies,theresearcherwantstohavearandomizedsample,andifthetestisexperimental,acontrolledtrialmightbeconducted.However,purposivesamplingcanbeuseddependingonwhattheaimofthestudyis:ifthestudyislookingatanarrowerpopulation,suchashowparticularintelligenceagentsappliedasystemofethicsintheircounterintelligencework,purposivesamplingwithinaparticularagencywouldmakesenseevenifthestudyisquantitative(Walliman2017).Thus,thereisnoonesizefitsallmodelforwhatkindofsamplingprocessshouldbeconducted:italldependsonthedesignofthestudyandthedatacollectionmethodologybeingused(LangandAltman2016).Inaqualitativestudy,onemightconductafocusgrouporintervieworcasestudy,allofwhichwilllikelyuseapurposivesamplingapproachbecauseitgivestheresearcherabetterfocusonpeoplewhorepresentthepopulationandachancetounderstandinmoredetailwhatthispopulationislikebasedoninterviewswithpeoplefromthatpopulation.Thenthatdatacanbetakentodevelopahypothesis,whichcanthenbetestedquantitativelywith,forinstance,asurveyofthewiderpopulationusingarandomsampleapproachtotestforstatisticalsignificanceofthenullhypothesis(Marshall1996).Thequalitativeresearchergainsmoredirectinsightintoaspecificpopulationthroughpurposivesampling.Whatisgivenupbynotusingrandomsamplingisaccesstoawiderpopulation.Thetrade-offisworthitthoughbecause,inordertounderstandonegroup,itrequiresnarrowup-closeexaminationandexploration(Walliman2017).Ifthefieldisopenedupatrandom,theresearcherwillnothavethesameopportunitytostudyupcloseasinglegrouporpopulationbutmayhaveoneparticipantfromthisgroupandanotherfromthatgroup,whichmakesthedatalessreliableandcanimpairthevalidityofthefindingsbecausetheapproachisnotfocused.Purposivesamplingcanworkwellwithquantitativeresearch,dependingonthenatureofthestudy,butingeneral,quantitativeresearchwillfocusontestingahypothesiswiththewiderpopulationandusingarandomizedsamplefromapopulationinsteadoftheirownjudgment(Palinkasetal.2015).Thisdoespresentalimitationintermsofrandomization.However,thecharacteristicsofthestudyaresuchthatrandomizationwithregardtodatacollectionisnotofprimaryimportancesincenotheoryorhypothesisisbeingtested.Circumstancesunderwhichaqualitativeresearchermightdecidetouserandomsamplinginsteadofpurposesamplingmightbeoneinwhichtheresearcheralreadyhasahypothesisformedandwantstoexplorewhetherthehypothesiscanbesignificantlyappliedamongthegeneralwiderpopulation.So,inthatcase,theresearchermightconductrandomsamplingtoobtainasmallpoolofparticipantsforafocusgrouporforinterviewsorforquestionnaires.Thishappenswhencompanieswanttotestanewproduct:theymayrandomlyselectparticipantsfromaspecificpopulationforafocusgroup,buttheywilllikelybeconductingamixed-methodsapproachandcollectingbothqualitativeandquantitativedata(WisdomandCreswell2013).Randomsamplingcanbeusedwhentheresearcheriswantingtocreateareliableandvaliddatasetandmaybeinterestedinthetriangulationofsources(CreswellandCreswell2018).Limitationsofthestudyincludethepossibilitythattheresearcher’sknowledgeandunderstandingofCImaybebiasedandnotnecessarilyaccuratelyreflectiveoftherealityoftheenvironment.Second,thecasestudiesselectedforreviewmaybeinadequatelyexaminedduetothelackofavailableresources.Astherearefewresourcesavailableforanalysis,itcouldbethecasethatpersonalopinionsoftheresearcherandofotherwritersaretakenasfactsresultinginpoorvalidityandreliability.Additionally,althoughanumberofprimaryandsecondarysourceswereusedforthisresearch,itispossiblethatimportantcriticaldatawasleftoutthatcouldaltertheinterpretationofthecasestudies.Inconclusion,thisresearchstudyusesacomparativecasestudyanalysisapproach.ThepurposeofthismethodistoexplorebywayofcomparativecasestudyanalysisthecounterintelligenceprogramunderJamesJesusAngleton,includingtheliteratureofthepastandpresent.Thegoaloftheresearchistoidentifywhattheethicalframeworkoughttobeforthecounterintelligencecommunitygoingforward.Thedatawillbeanalyzedusingcontentanalysisandorganizedthematically.Theframeworkbywhichthedatawillbeanalyzedwillbetheethicalframeworksofvirtueethics,dutyethics,utilitarianism,andethicalegoism.Samplingmethodswillbepurposiveandsnowball.CHAPTERFOURFINDINGS&ANALYSISAngleton’sCIProgramAngletonheadedtheCIA’scounterintelligenceprogramfortwodecades.Createdin1954,theCIprogramwashighlyinfluencedfromthebeginningbyAngleton(Morley2017).By1974,whenAngletonwasrelievedofhisdutiesbyCIAChiefWilliamColby,theAgencywasunderfireforhavingbeencaughtspyingonAmericancitizens,aclearviolationofitscharter(Morley2018).AngletonhadgonefarbeyondhismandateintheviewofClevelandCram,thesenioroperationsofficertaskedbyColbywithreviewingtheCIprogramunderAngleton’stwenty-yeartenure.Cramproduceda12-volumereport,eachvolumerunninghundredsofpageslong,detailingtheabusesthatoccurredunderAngleton’swatch.ThereportwasclassifiedconfidentialbytheCIAandnevermadepublic;however,someoftheprimarysourcesusedbyCramtoassistinthewritingofthereportweremadeavailabletoMorley,abiographerofAngleton.ThesourceswereobtainedfromGeorgetownUniversity’sBoothFamilyCenterforSpecialCollections(Morley2018).Thoughtherearemanyfocalpointsthatcouldbeexamined,includingtherolethatAngletonplayedinhandlingOswald’sfileinthelead-uptoandtheaftermathoftheJFKassassination,Morley(2018)focusedononesituationinparticular,emblematicoftheprobleminherentinAngleton’sCIprogram:whattodowithtwoKGBdefectorswhosestoriescontradictedoneanotherinthe1960s.AngletonwasconcernedwithSovietdisinformation;BritishalliesinCIwereconcernedwithSovietpenetrationandcitedthetreacheryofSirAnthonyBlunt,theWesternintelligenceoperativewhodefectedtotheSovietUnionandservedasaprimeexampleoftheextenttowhichtheCIAhadbeenpenetrated.Theso-calledRingofFive,whichincludedKimPhilby,GuyBurgess,DonMaclean,JohnCairncrossandBlunt,wereallexposedastraitorstotheCrown(Cram1993,5).TheBritishthusplacedmuchmoreemphasisonpenetration;Angletonlessso—untilGolitsynarrivedandinsistedthattheSovietshadpenetratedtheCIAatthehighestlevels(CentralIntelligenceAgency2011,39).FromthebeginningofhisworkattheheadofCI,AngletonhadacloseworkingrelationshipwiththeMossadandtraveledmonthlytoTelAviv;thisrelationshipbeganevenbeforetheCIprogramhadbeencreated,infact—whenAngletonwasCIAchiefofforeignintelligence(Morley2017,74).AnintimaterelationshipbetweenthetwointelligenceagenciesexistedthroughoutthedurationofAngleton’stenure.Angleton’sblindnesstotheriskofworkingcloselywiththeMossadwouldlaterleadtohiscritics,includingClareE.Petty,assertingthathewas“eitheragiantfraudora[double]agent”(Cram1993,8).Inthegameofusingdeceptiontoconfuseadversaries,theUSunderAngletonwasplayedbadly,andnoeventindicatedthismorethantheGolitsynvs.Nosenkodebacleofthe1960s(Morley2017).GolitsyndefectedfromtheSovietUnionin1961;Nosenkofollowedin1964.AngletonwaspartialtotheclaimsofGolitsynanddisbelievedNosenko,whilecriticsofAngletondismissedGolitsynandclungtoNosenkoasthesourceoftrueinformation.Golitsynenjoyedrelativefreedomandattention;NosenkounderwentimprisonmentandisolationforfouryearsuntilhisreleaseandsettlementinaWashingtonsuburb.GolitsynclaimedthattheKGBhadinfiltratedtheCIAandthatSovietdeceptionagainstWesternallieswasbeingusedtobringCommunismtotheWest(CentralIntelligenceAgency2011,40).WithGolitsyn,Angletondevelopedthe“MasterPlan”thesisthatdescribedthisideamorefully;criticslaterreferredtothisthesisasthe“MonsterPlot”outofdisgustforitsdetrimentaleffectsontheCIcommunity(CentralIntelligenceAgency2011,39-40).Consistentwiththe“MasterPlan”thesis,GolitsynaccusedNosenkoofdefectingsoastoprovidecoverforaSovietmoleintheCIA(Morley2018).AngletonbelievedNosenko,notGolitsyn,tobeadoubleagent.Angleton’scriticsarguedthatthetruthwasjusttheopposite.Nosenko’sreleasein1968andsubsequentquietlifefreeofscandalappearedtohavevalidatedAngleton’scritics.TheeffectofthisconfusionintheCIprogramunderAngletonwasatotalbreakdownoftrustwithintheCIcommunity(Cram1993).Agentwassetagainstagent,analystagainstanalystunderAngleton.AsMorley(2018)notes,AngletonandReuvenShiloah,founderofIsrael’sInstituteforIntelligenceandSpecialTasks,betterknownastheMossad,hada“specialrelationship.”AngletonidentifieddeeplywithIsrael,andsucceedingMossadChiefMeirAmitviewedAngleton’s“identificationwithIsrael[as]agreatassetforIsrael”(Morley2018).TherelationshipwassopronouncedthatMorley(2018)hasreferredtoAngletonasanIsraelirecruit.ItwastoAngletonthatAmosManor,chiefofIsrael’sShinBet,passedKhrushchev’ssecretspeechin1956.ThedocumentmadeAngletonastarintheintelligencecommunityandsolidifiedtherelationshipbetweenIsraelandAngleton(Morley2018).Angleton’sbeliefinthemolethesisproposedbyGolitsynwas,inpart,basedonhisownexperiencewithmoles.HehadbeenbestfriendswiththeBritishdiplomatKimPhilby,whodefectedtotheKGBinthe1950s.Angleton’spre-conceivednotionsledhimtobelieveGolitsynforemost.AgentJohnHart,whowroteTheMonsterPlan,oneofthesourcesusedbyCramandpassedontoMorley,statedcondemninglythatAngleton’shandlingoftheaffair“didnotconformtoanygenerallyacceptedsenseoftheterm‘methodology’”andthatan“improvementofintellectualstandards”intheCIprogramwasneeded(Morley2018).Whatwentunsaidwasanymentionofanimprovementintheagency’sethicalstandards.AstandardethicalframeworkhadnotbeenestablishedunderAngletonandhasnottothisday.Instead,Angletonfocusedondevelopinganetworkoftenuousrelationships,manyofwhichprovedtobefalse.ThefinalviewofAngleton’sCIprogramcanbesummedupappropriatelybyRavivandMelman(1990):“AdmirationfortheJewishstatebecameanobsession withAngleton,whofellcaptivetothemagicofIsraeliintelligence”(90).ThissuggeststhatratherthanputCIattheserviceoftheUS,AngletonplacedhimselfattheserviceofIsrael’sMossad.TheextenttowhichtheMossadusedAngletoncanbeseenattheveryleastinthedevelopmentofIsrael’snucleararsenal,whichoccurredunderAngleton’swatch.Angleton,whohadworkedrelativelycloselywiththeFBI,failedtofacilitatetheFBI’sinvestigationintotheNuclearMaterialsandEquipmentCorporation,fromwhichnuclearmaterialwasdivertedillegallytoIsrael(Morley2018).Inshort,Angletonwascompromisedbyaconflictofinterestthatsawhisloyaltytoonestateoverridehisdutiestoanother.Inothercounterintelligenceoperations,loyaltytoagrouportoanideahasledtosimilaroutcomes.ThePhoenixProgramandtheFBI’sCOINTELPROareexamplesofthis.ThePhoenixProgramandtheFBI’sCOINTELPROThoughproponentsofthePhoenixProgramhavehaileditaswildlysuccessful,conflictsofinterestplaguedtheProgramfromthestart,accordingtomembersoftheIntelligencecommunity,includingCaptainSidneyTowle,whosawtheeffectsoftheProgramfirsthandandwitnessedhowagentswouldabusetheirauthorityoutofpersonalspiteforadversaries(Valentine2014).Amixtureofcounterintelligenceandcounterinsurgency,thePhoenixProgramwasavastgrayareaofapplicationthatconsistedofidentifyingsuspectedadversariesandremovingthem.Theadversary,inthiscasewas,ostensibly,theVietCongInfrastructure(VCI).TheblurringoflinesbetweencounterintelligenceandcounterinsurgencyhelpedtopushCIinanewdirectionthatistodaycommonlyacceptedbythestateapparatus,thoughdeploredbyindividualslikeNolan(1997).TheProgramwasdescribedbyDrosnin(1975)as“theonlysystematizedkidnapping,tortureandassassinationprogrameversponsoredbytheUnitedStatesgovernment”(2).AbusesrangedthefrommurderofsuspectedVCtosuspectsbeingnamed,torturedandkilledsimplyasaresultofpersonalanimosityorlocalquarrelamongindividualswhowantedtoactonagrudgeandthusmadefalseaccusations,knowingthattheaccusedwouldeffectivelybeeliminated(Valentine2016).Atop-secretreportpublishedbyVietnamVeteransAgainsttheWarshowedthatPhoenixwaspartofabroadercampaignintheCIcommunitytoexpandtheoperationsofCIdrastically,usingPSYOPStoreinforceCIobjectives.FormerCaptainintheUSArmyDavidCurry,formerNavalIntelligenceofficerJoeMiller,formerAirForceIntelligenceofficerPatMcCann,formerArmySecurityAgencyofficerBillBranson,andformer1Lt.USArmyBarryRomo(1990)alltestifiedtothe“personallyandpoliticallydestructive”forcesthatsuchacampaignentailed.UnderOperationsPlanJERICHO,setinthePhilippinesinthe1980s,aPhoenix-styleprogramwasapprovedbytheArmyChiefsofStaff:“OperationsPlanJERICHOisthemandateforaprogramofcommunitycounter-intelligence(COINTELPRO)andpsychologicaloperations(PSYOPS)”thatCurryetal.believedwouldbe“morallycorruptingfortheprotagonists”(Curryetal.1990,20.).LikethePhoenixProgram,itblurredthelinesbetweenCI,PSYOPS,counterinsurgency,andgovernment-sponsoredterror.Bytheendofthe20thcentury,CIwasnolongersimplyaboutdisseminatingfalseinformationtoconfuseormisleadtheadversary:itwasnowpartofabroaderstrategytoattackandunderminetheadversary’scultureandsocialorganization.ThisstrategydidnotoriginatewithPhoenix.Itwasevident,aswell,intheFBI’sCOINTELPRO,whichbeganin1956.Itisstillevidenttodayinthe2020-2022NationalCounterintelligenceStrategyoftheUnitedStates,whichusesthegoalof“nationalsecurity”asthecatch-allforsteeringCIfurtherintotherealmofpsychologicalwarfare,counterinsurgency,anddefensivecovertoperations.TheSelectCommitteetoStudyGovernmentalOperationswithRespecttoIntelligenceActivities(1976)foundthat“officialsoftheintelligenceagenciesoccasionallyrecognizedthatcertainactivitieswereillegalbutexpressedconcernonlyfor‘flappotential.’EvenmoredisturbingwasthefrequenttestimonythatthelawandtheConstitutionweresimplyignored”(13).AgentsinCI,whetheractinginthePhoenixProgramorintheFBI’sCOINTELPRO,believedthemselvesandtheirconducttobeabovethelawandoutsidethepurviewofnormalethicalguidelinesbysheervirtueofthefactthattheywereengagedinwhatwastermedcounterintelligence.ThepervasiveattitudewasthatbeinginCIgavethemcarteblanchetodowhatevertheysawfitinordertodestroytheadversary.Fromthebeginning,theCIcommunityhadleapedfromengagingindeceptiontoseekingthedestructionoftheadversary.TheFBI’sCOINTELPROwasinitiatedwithasimilarobjectivetothatofthePhoenixProgram,thegoalistoinfiltrateAmericanorganizationsliketheBlackPanthersandtheKKK,assumepositionsofleadershipwithintheseorganizations,andco-opthem.COINTELPROtacticsincluded:“Anonymouslyattackingthepoliticalbeliefsoftargetsinordertoinducetheiremployerstofirethem;“Anonymouslymailingletterstothespousesofintelligencetargetsforthepurposeofdestroyingtheirmarriages;“ObtainingfromIRSthetaxreturnsofatargetandthenattemptingtoprovokeanIRSinvestigationfortheexpresspurposeofdeterringaprotestleaderfromattendingtheDemocraticNationalConvention;“FalselyandanonymouslylabelingasGovernmentinformants’membersofgroupsknowntobeviolent,therebyexposingthefalselylabeledmembertoexpulsionorphysicalattack;“Pursuanttoinstructionstouse‘misinformation’todisruptdemonstrations,employingsuchmeansasbroadcastingfakeordersonthesamecitizensbandradiofrequencyusedbydemonstrationmarshalstoattempttocontroldemonstrationsandduplicatingandfalselyfillingoutformssolicitinghousingforpersonscomingtoademonstration,therebycausing‘longanduselessjourneystolocatetheseaddresses’;“SendingananonymouslettertotheleaderofaChicagostreetgang(describedas‘violence-prone’)statingthattheBlackPanthersweresupposedtohave‘ahitoutforyou.’Theletterwassuggestedbecauseit‘mayintensify...animosity’andcausethestreetgangleaderto‘takeretaliatoryaction’;“From‘late1963’untilhisdeathin1968,MartinLutherKing,Jr.wasthetargetofanintensivecampaignbytheFederalBureauofInvestigationto‘neutralize’himasaneffectivecivilrightsleader.InthewordsofthemaninchargeoftheFBI\'s‘war’againstDr.King,‘Noholdswerebarred’”(TheSelectCommitteetoStudyGovernmentalOperationswithRespecttoIntelligenceActivities1976,10-11).TheideaofaCIprogramunconstrainedandengagedina“noholdsbarred”approachtoitsoperationsrevealstheextenttowhichcounterintelligenceoperationswerewithoutethicalguidelinesorframeworks.FBIAssistantDirectorWilliamSullivantestifiedthat“neveroncedidIhearanybody,includingmyself,raisethequestion:‘Isthiscourseofactionwhichwehaveagreeduponlawful,isitlegal,isitethicalormoral.’Wenevergaveanythoughttothislineofreasoning,becausewewerejustnaturallypragmatic”(TheSelectCommitteetoStudyGovernmentalOperationswithRespecttoIntelligenceActivities1976,14).PragmatismaloneguidedtheFBI’sCOINTELPROinthewordsofSullivan.AstheSelectCommitteepointedoutinitsfindingsin1976,thequestionraisedbyintelligenceofficers“wasusuallynotwhetheraparticularprogramwaslegalorethical,butwhetheritworked”(TheSelectCommitteetoStudyGovernmentalOperationswithRespecttoIntelligenceActivities1976,138).ItwasoftentheviewofCIofficersthat“inintelligence,thestakesinvolved,andtheinterestofnationalsecuritymaypermitamoretolerantinterpretationofmoral-ethicalvalues”(TheSelectCommitteetoStudyGovernmentalOperationswithRespecttoIntelligenceActivities1976,144).Sullivanstatedthatagentstypicallyhada“warpsychology,”meaningthattheyoperatedundertheassumptionthat,indeed,noholdsarebarred(TheSelectCommitteetoStudyGovernmentalOperationswithRespecttoIntelligenceActivities1976,144).ThepointmadebySullivanwasthatagentsinCIactedwithoutaskingmoralquestionsinthesamewayasoldierfiresupontheenemywithoutaskingwhetherwhatheisdoingisjustorunjust:hefiresbecausehehasbeentoldheisatwar.ThiscultureofwarisonethathelpstoexplainthepathologyofCIagentsunderAngleton,inthePhoenixProgram,andinCOINTELPRO.ItexplainsthetransgressionsmadebyAngleton’sCIdepartmentduringOperationCHAOS,inwhichtherecruitingandtrainingofdoubleagentsinthedomesticanti-warmovementledtoillegalspyingondomesticcitizens(Valentine2016).OperationCHAOSwasitselfanoutgrowthofthatsamewarculture:justasPhoenixledtoabusesinVietnam,OperationCHAOSledtoabusesathome.Theproblemofblurredlines:themandatetodeceivebecameviewedasamandatetodomuchmore.Therewasnooversight,andDirectorColbywasessentiallyforcedtoscapegoatAngletononlyafterNixon’s“plumbers”werearrested,andtheWatergatescandalerupted(Valentine2016).Solongasoperationscouldbejustifiedviathe“weareatwar”argument,theonlythingthatmatteredwasefficiency.MarkFelt,anotherAssistantFBIDirector,testifiedthat“hisjobwastoensurethatBureauprogramswerebeingoperatedefficiently,notconstitutionally”(TheSelectCommitteetoStudyGovernmentalOperationswithRespecttoIntelligenceActivities1976,155).Efficiencywastheorderoftheday.WereCImethodsefficient?Thatwasthesubjectivequestionthoseengagedincounterintelligenceaskedthemselves.Therecertainlywasnoobjectivemoralorethicalstandardbywhichtheycouldjudgethevirtueoftheiractions.Thissamequestionofwhat“workedbest”wastheoneaskedroutinelybyagentsoftheFBN,asformerFBNagentDeanUnkefer(2013)shows.TheFBNwasguidedsimilarlytotheFBIandCIAbyawhollypragmaticapproachtodrugenforcement,anditsuseofCIwasnodifferentfromthatoftheFBIorthePhoenixProgram.Ifalieordeceptiongotthejobdone,FBNagentsconsidereditagoodone,regardlessofhowimmoral,corrupting,messy,deadlyorextra-legaltheoutcome.CIintheFBNTomakecases,FBNagentsroutinelyactedasdrugbuyersordealers(Unkefer2013;Valentine2006).Theyinfiltratedmobrings,mafiafamilies,andentirecommunities;theyuseddeceptiontoensnaredrugtraffickersfordecades.Agentscutheroinandgaveitawaytoinformantsinexchangeforsecretsandloyalty;theykeptanddivideddrugmoneyamongstthemselvesanduseditbothtobuyoffotheractorsandfundlavishlifestyles(Unkefer2013).Inmanycases,theirdeceptionledtostartlinglyviolentconclusions.Inanyevent,theagentswereguidednotbyastandardofethicsbutratherbyapragmaticsenseofduty:theirdutywastostopdrugtraffickersbyanymeansnecessary.Skimmingoffthetopwastheirjustreward,manyagentsfelt,fordoingthedirtyworktheAmericangovernmentdemandedofthemyetwasdisinclinedtoremuneratetoanysubstantialdegree(Unkefer2013).Itwaspartlythisany-means-necessaryapproachthateventuallyledtotheundoingoftheFBN(Valentine2006).TheotherreasonfortheFBN’sundoing,asValentine(2006)shows,wasthatitwasincrediblyeffectiveinachievingitsgoal.Itspragmatic,typicallyamoralandunethicalapproachtoinfiltratinganddestroyingthedrugtradeeventuallycauseditsagentstorunafouloftheCIA,whichorganizationworkedcloselywithdrugtraffickersforitsownintelligenceandCIpurposes(Valentine2006).TheCIApulledmoreweightinthehierarchyofgovernment,andthuswhentheCIAsawitsownoperationsthreatenedbytheFBN’saggressivebuteffectivetactics,theCIAinitiatedanassaultontheFBNbywayofanethicscommittee.Essentially,whatledtotheFBN’ssuccesswasalsowhatledtoitsdownfall:agentswereturnedoneagainstanotherasanethicsprobeturnedthebureauinside-out,broughtchargesandconvictionsagainstseveralagents,andeventuallydismantledthebureaualtogether(Unkefer2013;Valentine2006).AconflictofinterestexistedatthestructuralandfunctionallevelsoftheFBNaswell.HenryAnslinger,whoheadedtheFBNfrom1930intothe1960s,hadtosatisfymultiplestakeholders,allofwhomheldcontradictorydesires(Valentine2006).Theestablished,well-connectedfamilies,whoseaccrualofwealthduringtherobberbaronerahadmadethempowerful,lookedtoAnslingerasakindofgatekeeper.ThedrugtradewasstilllicitinChinawhentheFBNwascreated,andthesefamiliesmademillionspartakinginthattrade,usingchannelsandworkingwithactorswhoalsoparticipatedintheillicittraffickingofdrugsintotheWest(Valentine2006).AnslingerwasessentiallyappointedtohisroleasheadoftheFBNbecausehehadmarriedintooneoftheseestablishedfamilies.Hewouldmakesurethatwhilethewarondrugswasprosecuted,theirinterestsabroadwouldnotbeinterferedwith(Valentine2006).Atthesametime,Anslingerhadtoappeasetheprohibitioniststaskedwithoverseeinghisperformance.Ifhedidnotproducecases,hecouldnotjustifytherequestforfundingorlegitimatetheneedforhisownjob.Caseswerethusencouragedtobemadeagainstaddictsandlower-leveldistributors,butthemajortraffickerswereessentiallyoff-limits(Valentine2006).This,inturn,ledtoaculturewithintheFBNofwhereinagentshadtodeceiveandlureaddictsandlow-leveldealers,flipthemintobecominginformants(oftenthroughblackmail),andengageinillegalactivitythemselvesbothtoensuretheircoverswerenotblownandtoexactadegreeofstreetjusticeinlieuoftheprosecutorsandjudges(perceivedtobeonthetake)supportingtheirworkwithconvictions(Unkefer2013;Valentine2006).UnderAnslinger,CIintheFBNwasusedinasimilarno-holds-barredmannertothatoftheCIAunderAngleton.Becausethedegreeofdeceptionusedbycase-makingagentsintheFBNwentbeyondtheirlegalmandate,reportswereroutinelyfalsified(Unkefer2013).Angletonalsofalsifiedreportsinattemptstoprevent“moles”intheCIAfromobtainingaccuratedata(Morley2017).Deceptionwasusedinthisregard,notjustagainstadversaries,butagainsttheStateforwhichtheseagencieswereworking.Deceptionraninbothdirections,andonlytheagentspracticingthedeceptionknewthetruthofthematter.WhenFBNagentsbeganmakingbiggercasesagainstmajortraffickers,thusthreateningtherelationshipswithinthetradefosteredbythewell-connectedfamiliesandtheCIA(whichalsorelieduponthesetraffickersforintelligenceandforcovertoperations),acrackdownontheFBNensued(Unkefer2013;Valentine2006).Thejustificationforthecrackdownwastheagency’suseofdeceptionagainsttheState.Theno-holds-barredapproacheventuallycamebacktobitetheFBNjustasitdidAngleton’sCIunit.Anslingerhaddonehisbesttoignorethecriminalactivityofalliesoftheestablishedfamiliesthatheansweredto,particularlyinthe1934caseoftheTransportesAereosCentro-Americanos(TACA)“HonduranGunsforDrugs”scandal,inwhichvariousagencies“protecteddrugsmugglerstoensurenationalsecurity,aswellastoprotectcorporateprofits”(Valentine2006,33).Anslingerhadtowalkatightropebetweenfulfillinghismandateandlookingtheotherwaywhenhisworkthreatenedtointerferewiththeaffairsofgroupswithspecialinterests,groupstowhomhehimselfowedhiscareerandfortune(Valentine2006).ConflictsofinterestatthetopcontributedtotheFBN’sdemise.DiscussionThecultureofdeceptionutilizedbytheMossadundoubtedlyplayedapartinthedevelopmentoftheCIcultureunderAngleton,asthelatterwashighlyinfluencedbyMossadagencypersonnel,asMorley(2017)hasshown.However,theframeofreferenceusedbytheMossadwasnotconsistentwiththatoftheAmericanintelligenceofficer:theMossad’smissionwastousedeceptiontoaidIsrael;byworkingcloselywiththeMossad,AngletonpotentiallymadehimselfanunwittingassetandpawnintheCImaneuversofIsrael.Angleton’sapparentobtusenesswithrespecttothetruenatureoftheRingofFiveandtheproblematicnatureoftheSovietdefectorsinthe1960sisbestunderstoodifoneconsidersthatAngletonreliedoninformationfromhisMossadassociates—associateswhoofferedlittleintelligenceonthesematters,saveapassingreferencetoPhilby’sdubiousloyalties(Morley2018).AngletonsimplyhadnotestablishedaclearframeofreferencefortheCIprograminAmericaandrelieduponforeignactors,withadubiousreputationthemselves.Intermsofanethicalstandard,hisownegoismservedastheframeofreference,and,likemanyotheragentsatthetime,hisdependencyuponalcoholdidnotsupportegoasasuitablereferencepoint(Morley2017,74).Angletonlackedanobjectiveframeworkoutsidehimself:therewasnoethicalframeworkemployedatall;ethicsweresupposed,butassumptionledtolaterunwelcomerevelationsandagreatdealofinsecurity,confusionandcontradictorynarrativeswhentheChurchCommitteebeganinvestigatingAngleton’sworkoftheprevioustwodecades.ThesameproblemoccurredforAnslingerandtheFBN.Anslingerhadnoethicalreferencepoint,noethicalstandardthatwasusedtoestablishaclearandacceptablecodeofconductwithrespecttoCI.ThePhoenixProgramlikewisesufferedfromsuchalackofanethicalframework,andtheFBI’sCOINTELPRO,alongwiththebroaderumbrellaOperationCHAOS,sufferedinthesameway.Ineachofthesecases,oneseesCIagentsgoingbeyondthemandateofoperatingtodeceivetheadversary;killing,torture,rape,trafficking,falsificationofreports,spyingondomesticcitizens—allofthisresultedfromthelackofanymoralorethicalconstraints.Timeandagain,agentsfromeachofthesecasesviewedwhatworked“best”asthecriteriaforjudgingthevirtueofone’sactions.Theseagentsbelievedthemselvestobeatwar,acrosstheboard,whethertheywereintheFBN,engagedinPhoenix,workinginCOINTELPROorattemptingtoferretoutmolesintheCIA.Becausetheyconsideredthemselvesatwar,theybelievedallwasfair.Theyhadasubjectiveethicalapproachtotheirworkthat,intheend,underminedtheirmissionsandsabotagedtheirownaims.EthicalPerspectivesThoughtheCIactivitiesdescribedhereinweretypicallyviewedasguidedbypragmatism,theethicalperspectivethatbestexplainsthemisEthicalEgoism:anends-justify-the-meansapproachtoCIactivitieswasroutinelyusedtojustifyanyandallformsofpolicies,programsandextra-legalinitiatives.BeginningfromthestandpointofLockeanethics,itcanbeseenhowagentsassumedtheywereatlibertytoconductthemselvesastheybestsawfitinatimeofwar.Eachagencyorunitsawitsactionsasbeingpartofabroaderwar.TherelevanceoftheColdWartothisviewpointisimportanttoconsider,astheColdWarmentalityundoubtedlyshapedtheminthisthinking.However,thelicensetoengageinactionsbothunconstitutionalandimmoralwasnevergrantedthem.Whetheragentsendedupbeingprosecutedforcrimesornot,theirmissionwascorruptedorunderminedbyalackofself-imposedconstraint.Sincetheysawnoimpetustoimposesuchconstraints,itcanbeconcludedthatsomeexternalandobjectivestandardwasneeded—andyetnoneexisted.Onecouldarguethattheactivitiesoftheagentsalignedwiththeirownpersonalsenseofdutyethics:agentsintheFBNbelievedittheirdutytoprosecutethewarondrugsandnothingwasoff-limitsinCIthatfacilitatedthisprosecution;thesamebeliefexistedforagentsoperatingunderPhoenixandCOINTELPRObutwithrespecttoCommunistadversariesandanti-waractivists,respectively;thesamebeliefexistedforAngletonbutwithrespecttohimselfandpossiblytohisIsraelifriendsintheMossad.Ontheotherhand,itcouldbearguedthattheagentswereactinginamannerconsistentwithutilitarianethics.Theyfrequentlyalludedtoapragmaticcourseofactionandthattheirmeasureforevaluatingthevirtueoftheiractionswasefficiencyandperceivedeffectiveness.However,eventheutilitarianframeworkinsistsuponsomethingofanobjectivestandardwithrespecttotheconceptofthecommongood.ItishardlythecasethatamongtheCIcommunity,thereexistedasenseofanobjectivecommongood:suchaconceptwasnotevenalludedtobyagentslikeSullivanorFeltintheirtestimonybeforeCongress.Individualagentsmayhavepossessedtheirownpersonalethicalcodes,consistentwiththetraditionalsystemofvirtueethics—butunlesscodifiedattheinstitutionallevelandmandatedthroughouttheorganization,suchpersonalcodescomeupshortinthelargerpicture.Ineachofthecasesexamined,therewasneveranyevidenceofanorganizationalsystemofvirtueethicsbeingfosteredforagentstofollow.Onthecontrary,inmanycases,theoppositewasfound:agentsabusedalcohol,soldoruseddrugs,tookpartintorture,engagedinillegalactsofviolence,andfailedtoupholdtheconstitutionthatasfederalofficers,theyweresworntoprotectandserve.TheonlyethicalframeworkthatbestandmostfullyexplainstheoperationsandactionsofagentsintheCIcommunityineachofthesecasesisEthicalEgoism.ItisattheheartofAnslinger’smoraldilemmawithallofhisdiversestakeholdersthatneededtobesatisfied.ItisattheheartofAngleton’sapproachtoCIingeneral.ItisattheheartofPhoenix,COINTELPROandOperationCHAOS.Itrepresentstheethicalsystemembracedbyagentsthroughouttheintelligencecommunityifnotactivelypromotedasanofficialethicalframeworkbytheirorganizations.StructuralFunctionalism,ConflictTheoryandCriticalTheoryWhyshouldEthicalEgoismcometobethedominantethicalsystemoftheCIcommunityfromthebeginning?CIintheUScannotbeunderstoodoutsidethecontextoftheColdWar.AngletonassumedcontroloftheCIA’sCIdivisionattheoutsetoftheColdWar.PhoenixandCOINTELPROwerebothColdWar-eraprograms.AnslingerheadedtheFBNbeginningin1930butbroughttheBureauintotheColdWarera.EvenasKennedysoughttocurtailtheColdWarinthe1960s,Angletonrefusedtobelievethatapeacefulconclusionwaspossible.AngletonoperatedundertheassumptionthatSovietRussiahadamasterplantospreadcommunismthroughouttheworld,andheacceptedthosewhosestoryagreedwithhisprimaryassumption.TheproblemhereisthatitputhimatoddswiththeCommanderinChief,whowantedde-escalationanddétente.ShouldnottheheadofCIhavebeenpredisposedtosuppresshisownassumptionsinordertofacilitatetheobjectivesanddirectivesofthePresident?Clearly,aconflictexistedintheearly1960sbetweentheWhiteHouseandtheCIA,whichwasengagedinclandestineoperationsaroundtheworld,particularlyinCuba.Kennedy’sthreattosmashtheCIAaftertheBayofPigsfiascoemphasizedthedegreetowhichtheAgencyandtheKennedyAdministrationwereatoddswithoneanother.Conflictwasnotwantingbetweenthetwo.TheassassinationofKennedyshiftedthingstosomeextent,buttherefusalofJohnsontorunforasecondfulltermgavewaytotheNixonAdministration,whichusheredinitsownhostofproblems.Beforelong,theintelligencecommunitywasattheforefrontofamajorSenateinvestigation,againfindingitselfinconflictwiththeobjectivesanddirectivesofthefederalgovernment.WhoorwhatinterestsshouldCIserve?Thatisabasicandfairquestionthatanyexistinggovernmenthasarighttoask.Inthecaseexamplesusedherein,itisoftenapparentthatCIprogramsservetheirowninterests,regardlessofwhetherornotthoseinterestsalignwiththebroaderinterestsoftheAmericanpublicortheAmericangovernment.Ifthereistobeconflict,sobeit—butcounterintelligenceworkistogoon,unobstructed;suchhasappearedtobetheoveralltheme.ItisacknowledgedbythegovernmentthatCIiscriticaltonationalsecurity,butjusthowCIshouldassistinsecuritymattershasneverbeenadequatelyestablished.OnereasonforthisisthattherehasbeennoproperoversightormanagementoftheCIcommunity.Theintelligencecommunityoperatesessentiallyautonomously.Withoutproperaccountability,therecannotbethetypeofenforcementnecessaryforeffectivelyimplementingacodeofconductorethicalframework.ThisistheprimarychallengefacinganyseriousapplicationofanethicalstandardtotheCIcommunity.Fromthestandpointofstructuralfunctionalism,theproblemsrundeeper.CIissituatedwithinalargerintelligenceandcovertoperationssecurityapparatus.ThisiswhyCIisoftenlinkedwiththetopicofnationalsecuritytoday.Counterintelligenceisandhasbeencoupledwithcounterterrorism,counterinsurgency,andcovertoperations;theinternationalbusinessandfinancecommunityisalargestakeholderintheintelligencecommunity;governmentsaroundtheworldareaswell.CIisthuspartofacomplicatedandintegratednetworkwithsocial,economic,andpoliticalfactorstoconsider.NotallactorsinCIlookatthemacro-environmentinwhichtheyoperate,butindividualslikeAnslingerandAngletondidhavetoconsiderthatenvironment.Theirconsiderations,perspectives,andinterpretationsofthatenvironmentarewhatledthemtomakethedecisionstheymade:forexample,AnslingerwithrespecttotheTransportesAereosCentro-Americanosscandal;AngletonwithrespecttotheGolitsynvs.Nosenkocontroversy.ThePhoenixProgramwasbornoutofaColdWarmentalityinwhichakindofcovert“totalwar”wascondonedbytheheadsoftheintelligencecommunityinVietnam.AsimilarapproachwastakenwithCOINTELPROandOperationCHAOS.Thesewereactionstakenoutofconsiderationforthepreservationofthestatusquoarrangementbetweenestablishedfamilies,governments,andinstitutions.Topreservethatstatusquoarrangement,theintelligencecommunitywentontheoffensive.TheCIcommunitywasliterallyalongfortheride,withoutoversight,withoutconstraints,andwithoutanyspecialregardforwhatitsmandateactuallywas.TheheadsofCIhadtheirownintereststoconsideraswell.TheevidenceshowsthatbothAngletonandAnslingerlookedtheotherwaywhenperceivedalliesengagedincriminalactivity.Eachhadinterestsintermsofpersonalrelationshipsandcareerstoconsider,andthoseinterestsconflictedwiththemissionmandatedbytheState.ThiswasalsotrueforagentsinthePhoenixProgram.Anslingerespeciallyhadtonavigateacomplicatedsetofrelationships.Viewingthesecasesfromastructural-functionalismperspectiveishelpfulinunderstandingtheLockeanapproachtoethicsadoptedbytheCIcommunityandhowthatapproachdriftedintoEthicalEgoism.Fromaconflicttheoryperspective,theCIcommunityemergesastheconflictedcommunitypulledindifferentdirectionsatonceasvariousstakeholdersvieforcontrolofinformationalresources.Conflicttheoryistheideathatgroupsareinconflictinsocietyoverresourcesandpower:thedominantgroupcontrolstheresourcesandwantstopreventtheothergroupfromobtainingpowerandstatusinsociety.AngletonwascertainlyconcernedaboutcontrollinginformationasheadoftheCIA’sCIprogram.Anslingerwasmoreconcernedwithmanagingoutcomesandsatisfyingstakeholders,whetheritwasTreasurySecretaryHenryMorganthauortheMellonsandRoosevelts(Valentine2006).Thepointisthatconflictsofinterestwereparforthecourse,andtherewasnotinstitutionalizedway,noorganizationalcodeofethicsinplace,norecoursetooversightuntilpublicscandalsforcedtheSenatetotakeaction,fortheCIcommunitytoadoptanobjectiveethicalframeworkconsideringtheinternalandexternalconflictswithwhichitwasfaced.TheCIcommunitywasandhasalwaysbeenreactionaryratherthanproactiveinthisrespect.Conflicttheorypositsthattherearefiniteresources,andgroupsareinastruggleforpoweroverthoseresources.Asaresult,thereisusuallyagroupthathaspowerandconsolidatesbycontrollingtheleversofjustice,politics,business,andsoon;andthereisagroupthatdoesnothavepowerthatstrugglestoobtainit.Ineachofthecasesanalyzed,thoseengagedinCIactedonbehalfof“nationalsecurity”andusedtheirpowertopreventchallengerstonationalsecurity,i.e.,thestatusquo,fromupsettingtheestablishedorder.ItishelpfultounderstandCIfromtheperspectiveofconflicttheory.Thisisacommunitythatisorganizedontheprincipleofsurvival:asAnslingerwellunderstood,itisnotjusttheStateintheabstractsensethatisbeingservedbyCIbutratherthegroupsthathavepower—theestablishedfamilies,theinternationalbusinessesandcartels,thepoliticalfactions,andthepowerbrokers.Deceptionisusedindifferentdirectionsbecause,ultimately,theCIcommunityservestheinterestsofdiversestakeholderswhoareattimesinconflictwithoneanother.Butinademocraticsociety,canthistypeofservicebejustifiedtocitizenswhobelievetheirgovernmentshouldservetheirinterestsfirstandforemost?WhenanalyzingtheCIcommunityfromthisstandpoint,thelackofanethicalframeworkappearsdeliberateandMachiavellian.Fromacriticaltheoryperspective,adeconstructionofcontemporarycultureisinorder.ValentineapproachesthetopicofCIlikeadeconstructionist,intentoninterpretingtheactionsoftheintelligencecommunityattheintersectionofcultureandpower.Ratherthanseeingitintermsofaconflictparadigm,ValentineseesCIintermsofapowerparadigm.Phoenix,COINTELPRO,OperationCHAOS,theworkoftheFBNandAngleton’sCIprogramarealllimbsofthesamecontrollingbodypolitic.ThatbodypoliticisexternaltotheConstitutionthewayadeitymightbesaidtobeexternaltotheworldcreated:thedeitymadetheworldandsetitinmotionbutisnotboundbythelawsofmechanicsthatkeepitinmotion.TheConstitution,inotherwords,istheretoservethebodypolitic,nottheotherwayaround.IftheConstitutiondoesnotserveitinitsneeds,thenitneednotbeobserved.This,too,explainsthethinkingoftheCIagentsinthecaseshereindiscussed.Fromthisstandpoint,thequestionthatremainsiswhethercitizensoftheUSshouldacceptthattheyaregovernedorruledbysuchabodypoliticandsubmit,orwhethertheyhavearightoreventhemeanstoprotestanddemandachange.Assumingthelatter,itstandstoreasonthatthebodypoliticisnotfreeofcensure.Tobringthebodypoliticintoconformitywiththeruleoflaw,itisimperativethatastandardethicalframeworkisappliedthroughouttheCIcommunity.Itisalsoassumedthatsuchwouldbetterservetheinterestsofthecommongoodthanthecurrentambiguousapproachtoethicsservestheinterestsofthebodypolitic.Ultimately,thepowerofthebodypoliticistenuous;butiftheconsentofthepeopleisgiventothebodypoliticoutofrespectforanapparentalignmentofinterests,itmaybesupposedthatamoreharmoniousglobalsocietycanbetheoutcome.ToaddresstheissuesofCIintheUS,onemustlookatthecultureofelitism.TheCIcommunitystraddlestheintersectionofelitismandcovertmilitaryaction.Itexistsinagrayzoneofhierarchicalorderandcarteblancheimplicitness;itisamixtureofegalitarianprinciplesandelitism.ThecultureoftheCIcommunityisthusconfused,conflicted,andschizophrenic.AsAugustineisfamousforsaying,“Indubiislibertas”—“Whenindoubt,liberty”(Perisho2020,1).TheCIcommunitytakesextensivelibertieswhereothersmightdefertotheruleoflawbecauseofthecultureoftheCIcommunity.Toaddresstheissueofethics,theissueofculturealsohastobeaddressed.Fromacriticaltheoryperspective,thisisthemostimportantrealizationtohave.EthicalFrameworktoApplyMostexplorationsoftheissueofethicsandCIstopshortofrecommendinganethicalframework.ThepurposeofthisresearchwastohighlighttheproblemsinCIusingcomparativecasestudyanalysisinordertofacilitatethedevelopmentofanethicalframeworkthatcouldpreventfutureconflicts.TheethicalframeworkmostofteninuseintheCIcasesexaminedisthatofEthicalEgoism.EthicalEgoismisnotaviableethicalframework;however,forthefactisthatitishighlysubjective,pragmatictoadangerousdegree,andpotentiallyamoral.TheproblemofCIisnotoneofconstraintbutratheroneofunrestrainedfreedom.CIshouldbegovernedbythesameethicalstandardsthatareexpectedofanyoneinsociety.Tobeotherwiseistoinvitescandalandabuselikewhathasbeenseenalreadyinthepast.WhatshouldbethebestethicalframeworkforCI?Virtueethicsisthetraditionalethicalfoundationinboththeeastandthewest.Assuch,itisworthconsideringthemeritsofavirtueethicsframework.AcasebycaseassessmentinthelightofthisethicalsystemcouldshowwhatmighthavehappeneddifferentlyhadasystemofvirtueethicsprevailedintheCIcommunityunderAngleton,inPhoenixortheFBI,orintheFBN,buthypotheticalsuppositionsaside,thereisenoughargumentinfavoroftheapplicationofavirtueethicssystemamongresearchersandscholarstodaytoseewhythissystemisnotonlythebestbutalsoessentialforsuccess.Ethicalsystemsalreadyexist.TheLawEnforcementOathofOffice,forexample,focusesonprotecting,upholdinganddefendingtheConstitutionoftheUnitedStates.ItalsocontainstermswithintheOaththatexplainclearlyhowofficersshouldconductthemselves:theyareexpectedtoactwithsobriety,honorandhonesty.ItwastoooftenthecaseintheCIcommunityandintheFBNthatagentsactedwithnoneoftheseor,withaperceivedhonor,taintedbyawarculturementalitythatmadeitentirelysubjectiveanddubious.Thereasonslawenforcementagenciescodifytheethicstheywanttheirofficerstofollowaresimple:unlessthecodeexists,itisnotenforceableorevenpracticable.Withacodeofethicsinhand,itispossibletoguideofficersandteachthemtoengageinethicaldecisionmaking.Ethicaldecisionmakingissimplytheactofmakingtherightdecisionmorally.Officersandagentsmaypossessanunconsciousorimplicitbias,buthavingacodeofethicsinplacehelpsthemtoremembertobasetheirdecisionsontheethicalcoderatherthanonpersonalorsubjectivefeelingsandperceptions.Inhealthcaresettings,healthcareworkershavetheirowncodeofethicsaswell.Oneofthemostcommonprinciplesinhealthcareistodonoharm.Anotheristorespectthehumanrightsofthepatientatalltimes.Theseprincipleshelptoformthebasisoftheethicalsystemsapplicabletotheirfield.BecausetheCIcommunityfacesaculturalconflictinherenttoitsownenvironment,anethicalframeworkshouldfocusonculture,andthatiswherevirtueethicscomesintoplaymostfully.Inorderfortheethicalcodetobeimplementedeffectively,agentswithintheCIcommunityneedtoengageincriticalthinking.Criticalthinkingisaskillthatcanbetaught,butitrequiresextensivetrainingandpractice,andtoooften,itcanbeneglected.Thisisafurtherreasonwhycultureissoimportant,asculturereinforcesthenormsandbehaviorsthataresupposedtobesecondnaturetothosewithinanorganization.Agentswhousecriticalthinkingwouldtypicallyhavetoaskthemselvesaseriesofquestionswhenmakingdecisionsregardingthemoralityofcertainactionsunderconsideration.Theywouldhavetoaskiftheactionislegal,whetherithasthecommongoodasanend,whetheritispractical—i.e.,hasutility;whetherthereareanybetteroptionsthatcouldpotentiallyleadtoanevengreatergood;whethertheproposedactioncontradictsorunderminesanethicalprinciple;whethertheactionviolatesthecodeofethics;whethertheactioncouldbereasonablyjustifiedbeforethepublicwereittobescrutinized.Theseareallthoughtprocessesthatwouldgointoengagingincriticalthought.TofacilitatecriticalthoughtandthedevelopmentofasuitableculturewithintheCIcommunity,asystemofvirtueethicsshouldbeimplementedandstandardized,andcharactereducationshouldbepartofthetrainingofallCIpersonnel.Gong(2010)makesthebestcaseforwhyvirtueethicsstillmatter,andhisargumentrunsthus:thesystemofvirtueethicsdevelopedintraditionalsocietybecausethegoalsofcharacterformationconformedwelltotheneedsandstructuresoftraditionalsocieties.Inmodernsocieties,themoralspirithasbecomemorediverseandpragmatictoreflectthediversedimensionsofcomplexmodernlife.However,thistransformationofthemoralspiritisproblematicbecausemodernsocietyisnolessdependentuponvirtuesthantraditionalsocieties.Infact,becauseofthecomplexityofrelationshipsandinteractionsinmodernlife,arule-basedethicalsystemisevenmoreessentialandapplicable.Self-identityisformedbyvirtues;moralcharacterisdefinedbyone’shabits,goodorbad.Asmodernsocietyhasorganizedaroundautilitarianethic,whichgiveswaytoLockeanethicsandtoEthicalEgoism,rulesthemselvesarefoundtobeinadequate(Gong2010).ThecasesofCIexaminedhereinshowasmuch:toomuchemphasisonpragmatismwhileignoringtheruleoflawisparforthecourseintheCIcasesdiscussed.Gong(2010)concludesthat“virtuesareamoralresourceformodernpeopletoresistmodernevils”(255).Ifthatresourceisunavailabletoactors,theyarelimitedintermsoftheireffectivenessinachievingthegood.Alackofmoralconstraintconstrainsone’sabilitytoachievegoodends.Thesystemofvirtueethicsprovidestheruleforexercisingmoralconstraintandtherebyenablingonetopursuegoodends.Characterformationisthegoalofvirtueethics.CharactereducationisthusanimportantelementofapplyingasystemofvirtueethicsintheCIcommunity.Kristjansson(2014)pointsoutthatthebasisforcharactereducationisAristotelianism.Aristotleprovidesthebasicethosofcharacterformationandhowitshouldbepursuedbyindividuals.Charactereducationshouldbeatthebedrockofanyseriousandeffectivedecision-makingprocess,andforagentsworkingintheCIcommunity,thisbedrockhastobeformedsoastopreventthekindofconflictsofinterestandabusesofpowerthatcharacterizetheCIcasesdiscussed.IfcharactereducationandvirtueethicshadbeenpromotedandfosteredintheCIcommunityfromthebeginning,thehistoryofthepastcenturycouldverywellhavebeenmuchdifferent.Thecultureofcounterintelligenceisstillyetanothermatterthatmustbeaddressed.IftheCIcommunitypersistsinexistingatthecrossroadsofegalitarianismandelitism,itwillforeverbeconflicted.WhatisneededtodayisamuchmorecollaborativespiritnotjustamongCIagenciesbutalsobetweentheCIcommunityandthebusinessworld,wheresomuchdataandintellectualpropertyisatriskasaresultoftheworldhavingmovedfirmlyintotheageofdigitalinformation.Thatcollaborativespiritcannotbeeffectedwithoutpropertraining,withoutproperassessmentofthevirtuesthatmustbecultivatedamongactors,orwithouttheproperpolicyforattainingobjectives.Sufficetosay,anoverhauloftheculturalperspectiveofthosetaskedwithleadingnotjusttheCIcommunitybutalsointelligenceoverallissorelyneeded.Thecurrentcultureisahotbedofconflictinginterests.ThegovernmentintheUSisbyandforthepeople,anditmustbeinsistedthattheCIcommunitysubmittotheprinciplesofdemocraticoversightandregulation.Tohaveacommunitythatrevertstopragmatismbecauseitknowsthatattheendoftheday,thereisgoingtobelittleaccountability(unlesspublicscandalforcesit)isinsufficient,destructive,andantagonistictothespiritofdemocracyandfreedomthatgovernmentismeanttosupportnotundermine.IftheCIcommunityistocorrectpastabusesandfacilitatetheworkofthecommunity,ithastoclarifyitsmission,settheparametersofitsmandatewithinitsethicalsystem,andimplementastandardizedcodeofethicsbasedonthevirtueethicssystem.ThevirtueethicssystemisthatpromotedbothinAristotelianismandConfucianism:itfocusesontherightdevelopmentofcharacterinaccordancewiththeacquisitionandmaintenanceofgoodhabits.ItisthissystemthatshouldassisttheCIcommunityinthefuture.CHAPTERFIVECONCLUSIONThepurposeofthisstudyhasbeentoproposeastandardizedethicalframeworkforguidingthecounterintelligenceprograminthe21stcentury.Byusingcomparativecasestudyanalysis,ithasshownthatCIunderAngleton,CIinthePhoenixProgramandCIintheFBI’sCOINTELPRO,andCIusedbytheFBNhaveallsufferedfromalackofethics.Thesecases’problemsarebestcharacterizedasstemmingfromrelianceuponEthicalEgoism,anevolutionofLockeanEthicsandanoutgrowthofapoorlydefinedorconstrainedutilitarianism.TosupportcollaborationamongthevariousUSICmembersinanethicalandproductivemanner,theCIcommunitymuststandardizevirtueethicsasthepreferredandessentialethicalsystem.Itmustengageincharactereducationsoastoprovideafoundationforthetypeofvirtuethatistobefostered.Itmustdevelopamoresuitablecultureinwhichthevirtueethicscansubsistandinwhichcharacterformationcanbefacilitated.ThelackofcollaborationamongtheCIagenciesisaresultofthelackoftrustandtransparency.TheblendingofCIwithotherintelligenceactivitiesisacorruptionoftheusageofCI:controversialandillegalCIactivitieshavebeenjustifiedinternallyandbeforeCongressbyappealstonationalsecurity.CIshouldnotbeconflatedwithnationalsecuritybutratherwiththeconscientioususageofdeceptiontomisleadandconfuseadversaries.However,thisobjectivemustbedonewithinthevirtueethicsframeworktopreventabuses.Deceptionisanancienttoolthathasoftenbeenusedthroughoutsocietiesaroundtheworld.Problemsarisewhenself-deceptionsetsin,orwhenonebeginsdeceivingthoseoneismeanttoserve.ThishasbeenadangerinCIfromthebeginning.Angletonfelltoself-deceptionandfailedtorecognizetowhomheowedhisloyaltiesfirstandforemost.Anslingersoughttoservetoomanydifferentstakeholderswithdifferentinterestsandneglectedtogivehisagentsaproperethicalframework.TheFBIusedCOINTELPROtospyonAmericancitizens.PhoenixwasdesignedtogiveCIagentscarteblancheinaforeignlandwheretortureandotherillegalmeanscouldbeusedwithoutconstraint.Atnotimedidagentshaveacodeofethicsorethicalframeworktofallbackon.Atnotimedidtheyhavetopartakeincharactereducationaspartoftheirtraining.Theyexistedinasubjectiveandambiguousgrayzoneofgovernmentwork,whereawarculturewastheonlycultureinformingthem.TofacilitatecollaborationamongthevariousCIagencies,theCIcommunitymustestablishaclearframeworkforaccountability.Implementingavirtueethicsframeworkandinsistinguponcharactereducationandproperoversightisessential.ThisadmittedlywouldrequireatotaloverhaulintermsofhowintelligenceisapproachedintheUS,butsuchanoverhaulshouldnotbeviewedasoverwhelming;rather,itshouldbeviewedasabsolutelynecessaryforthecommongoodofthenation.Thenationismorethanjustahandfulofestablishedfamilieswithinternationalbusinessinterests.Therearemorethan300millionpeopleinAmerica,andeachofthemisastakeholder.Bycollaboratingethicallyandopenly,theCIcommunityservesthemallinturn.

Stuck Writing Your "Ethics Needed in the US Counterintelligence Community" Capstone Project?

View All Our Example Ethics Needed in the US Counterintelligence Community Capstone Project

Have A Custom Example Essay Written

.....

Show More ⇣

     Open the full completed essay and source list


OR

     Order a one-of-a-kind custom essay on this topic


sample essay writing service

Cite This Resource:

Latest APA Format (6th edition)

Copy Reference
"Ethics Needed In The US Counterintelligence Community" (2020, September 16) Retrieved April 28, 2025, from
https://www.aceyourpaper.com/essays/ethics-needed-counterintelligence-community-2181516

Latest MLA Format (8th edition)

Copy Reference
"Ethics Needed In The US Counterintelligence Community" 16 September 2020. Web.28 April. 2025. <
https://www.aceyourpaper.com/essays/ethics-needed-counterintelligence-community-2181516>

Latest Chicago Format (16th edition)

Copy Reference
"Ethics Needed In The US Counterintelligence Community", 16 September 2020, Accessed.28 April. 2025,
https://www.aceyourpaper.com/essays/ethics-needed-counterintelligence-community-2181516
   

Open, View, and/or
Download this Document
order custom essay example